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ABSTRACT
This Article critiques the practice of limiting federal agency
authority in the name of federalism. Existing limits bind agencies even
more tightly than Congress. For instance, although Congress can
regulate to the limits of its commerce power with a sufficiently clear
statement of its intent to do so, absent clear congressional
authorization an agency cannot, no matter how clear the language of
the agency’s regulation. Similarly, although Congress can preempt
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state law, albeit only when its intent to do so is clear, some
commentators have read a line of Supreme Court decisions to hold
that agencies cannot, except upon Congress’s clear authorization.
A number of leading commentators have hailed this combination
of rules on the ground that congressional control over questions of
federalism should be preferred to agency decisionmaking. Congress,
they claim, is more deliberative, more transparent to the public, and
more accountable than the executive. Additionally, given the relative
ease of enacting regulations rather than statutes, those who favor
Congress fear that lower barriers to federal expansion in the executive
would lead to runaway federal power.
We argue that both these sets of claims are, at best, only
occasionally accurate. In many instances agencies are—or with wise
doctrines of judicial review can be made to be—more democratic and
deliberative than Congress. Although regulating almost always is
easier than legislating, in many instances the need for additional speed
bumps under the wheels of the executive is negligible or downright
counterproductive. Thus, we argue for a more nuanced set of rules
that would permit agencies in many instances to preempt or regulate
without the need for express congressional approval.
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INTRODUCTION
There are few policy areas in the United States in which
decisions are made wholly either at the federal or state and local
level. States have taken up issues such as immigration reform and the
global climate once thought to be exclusively in the realm of the
1
federal government. Similarly, federal regulators have aired views,
sometimes said to be authoritative, on subjects once traditionally in
2
the realm of states, such as tort liability for defective products. Thus,
1. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 (2007) (revealing how the “federal-state-local dynamic
operates as an integrated system to manage contemporary immigration”); Editorial, The
Immigration Wilderness, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A36; Raymond Hernandez, Republicans
in Congress Propose Bills on Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at B5; Andrew C. Revkin &
Jennifer S. Lee, White House Attacked for Letting States Lead on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2003, at A32.
2. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 49–58 (2006) (surveying
the landscape of the Rehnquist Court’s preemption decisions); David A. Kessler & David C.
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96
GEO. L.J. 461, 462–67, 473–74 (2007) (discussing significant shift in FDA policy to preemption
of state law failure-to-warn claims); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal
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the regulatory enterprise confronts the constant question of how best
to divide up authority among different levels of government.
That problem, of course, raises a question of its own: who best to
decide how best to divide? With some modest exceptions, most courts
3
and commentators have looked to Congress. Federal courts have
done little to limit federal power directly. Instead, they have insisted
on rules that give primacy to Congress, but also impose some burden
on Congress to make good decisions. We argue in this Article that
this allocation is a mistake, and that instead federal agencies should
often be the preferred institutions in which to vest the authority to
allocate power between states and the federal government.
To be more precise, we take issue with the important claim,
advanced by Professors Thomas Merrill, Cass Sunstein, and others,
that agency power to displace state lawmaking should be more
4
limited than Congress’s power to do so. Merrill and Sunstein both
assert that these additional limits are necessary for two basic reasons.
First, they aver that the work of agencies is less deliberative,
5
democratic, and transparent than legislation. Second, because agency
rulemaking is easier than legislating, executive action, absent judicial
6
oversight, would upset the balance of federalism.

Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227–41 (2007)
(highlighting the trend of deferring to agency preemption determinations).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 32–63.
4. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 695, 699 (2008) (supporting a presumption against agency preemption and arguing that
it seems unlikely that Congress intended such preemption); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing
Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 826,
833–34 (2005) [hereinafter Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich] (arguing that “[i]n order to
rescue federalism after Raich, the Court should return to the clear statement strategy for
determining the scope of congressional power,” which protects federalism and separation of
powers values); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2141–51, 2170 (2004) (arguing that only
Congress can exercise “legislative” power); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2110, 2120 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron] (arguing that substantive norms against constitutionally doubtful
legislation should trump ordinary deference to agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons]
(arguing that Congress should make highly sensitive decisions); Ernest A. Young, Executive
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 871 (2008) (“[W]e may wish to restrict the agencies’ role in
preemption to interpreting what Congress has done.”).
5. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2111–15.
6. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV 727, 755–
56, 759 (2008); Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2111–13;
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 320–21.
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These concerns arise in two significant controversies in
administrative law. The first is preemption. Congress can preempt
state law by statute so long as the statute is within the bounds of
Congress’s powers under the Constitution and Congress clearly
7
indicates that the statute has preemptive effect. According to
Professor Merrill, however, agency regulations cannot preempt state
law, no matter how clearly the regulation is written, because any
interference with state law should require action by Congress itself.
Merrill has gone so far as to argue in an amicus brief to the Supreme
8
Court that courts should not grant deference to any agency
interpretation of a statute that potentially could result in the
preemption of state law, including any law a state may decide to
9
adopt in the future.
The second controversy in modern administrative law addressed
10
by Professors Merrill and Sunstein is nondelegation. For example, in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. United
11
States Army Corps of Engineers, the Court struck down Army Corps
of Engineers regulations applying the Clean Water Act to intrastate
12
bodies of water hydrologically connected to navigable waters.
Because the Court found that Congress had not clearly authorized the
Army Corps of Engineers to exercise jurisdiction so broadly, and
because regulating waters that are remote from (although
hydrologically connected to) navigable waters arguably expanded
federal power at the expense of the states, the Court struck down the
Army Corps of Engineers regulation as beyond its delegated
13
statutory authority. Merrill and Sunstein applaud this approach,

7. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. Brief for the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Laws, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6–8, 16–19, Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2006) (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570991.
10. The nondelegation doctrine is a set of rules of administrative law limiting the scope of
decisionmaking authority that Congress can validly grant to an agency. For a thorough
background in the theory and practice of nondelegation, see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109
YALE L.J. 1399 (2000); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4.
11. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
12. Id. at 173–74.
13. Id. We note, though, that there are alternative readings of SWANCC under which the
nondelegation rationale would be only an alternative holding.
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apparently on the ground that it requires any federal action
14
implicating federalism concerns to come directly from Congress.
We argue that these claims at best sit uneasily with the realist
approach to administrative law. Notably, Chevron recognized
statutory interpretation as a political act that might be performed as
15
well, if not better, by agencies than by courts. Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
16
Insurance Co. justified that assumption by giving the judiciary the
power to closely inspect the openness and deliberativeness of
17
rulemaking—a critical shift from the easily met 1946 standard.
18
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) v. Schor also
blurred the roles of courts and agencies by limiting the earlier
formalistic decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
19
Marathon Pipe Line Co. that had suggested that agencies could not
adjudicate common law causes of action because they were not
20
Article III courts.
This move to realism is significant because the claims of
congressional primacy can be defended, we argue, only on formalist
grounds. For example, we show that, in the wake of State Farm and in
light of the realities we sketch below, the claim that agencies are not
sufficiently transparent or deliberative is often mistaken. Further, we
argue that concerns about the relative ease of rulemaking compared
to legislation cannot justify an absolute rule against agency
expansions of federal power, as in SWANCC (although we
acknowledge that they might justify lesser or occasional restraints).
Rather, the basis for such a rule would have to lie in some sort of
claim about exclusive judicial or congressional power to decide the

14. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 317–18 (“[H]ighly sensitive
decisions should be made by Congress, and not by the executive pursuant to open-ended
legislative instructions.”).
15. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy . . . the challenge must fail.”).
16. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
17. Compare id. at 30–31 (requiring courts to ensure that the agency considered relevant
factors), with Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) (holding that
courts presume the existence of facts justifying a particular regulation that is within the scope of
the agency’s delegated authority).
18. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC) v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
19. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
20. CFTC, 478 U.S. at 854, 862–63; N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 80, 84–87.
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appropriate scope of national authority, an exclusivity we believe
cannot be squared with the basic rationales of federalism.
In short, the best approach to these questions turns on a
functional analysis of which branch is most likely to best perform the
21
task of allocating policymaking power. We readily admit that if it
proves true that agencies do not perform as well as Congress or courts
at allocating authority—if they are not as transparent, deliberative, or
accountable—they deserve closer scrutiny. Accordingly, much of our
project here is devoted to comparing the relative institutional
competence of the three branches. We find that, for the most part,
agencies outperform the others.
For example, there are strong indications that agency actions,
especially notice-and-comment rulemaking, are more transparent
than congressional actions. Agencies are required to publish notices
of their proposed actions and to allow interested persons to
participate in rulemaking proceedings. Hence, interest groups
concerned about regulatory issues will know of any prospective
agency action before it happens, and interest group entrepreneurs can
inform their public constituencies of the proposed action. By contrast,
Congress has the ability to hide actions in unrelated legislation, and if
a bill is complex enough even the members of Congress may be
22
unaware of what provisions have been inserted.
In addition, there are even stronger arguments that agencies act
23
more deliberatively than Congress. Unlike Congress, an agency must
at least provide a meaningful justification for an action, explain why
suggested alternative actions are less desirable in terms of the
agency’s statutory mandate, and respond to criticisms of its action by
24
those who disagree with it. Moreover, in light of the uncertainty
agencies face about the individual judge who may review any agency
action, agencies are also forced to consider different ideological and
social perspectives and to respond to how those with differing

21. We are hardly the first to argue for a functional approach to these questions. For
examples of scholars that seem to rely on a functional approach, see infra note 55. Professor
Catherine Sharkey advocates an approach that considers the “institutional dimension” in
preemption decisions. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 452 (2008).
22. See Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 167 (Autumn 1993) (noting that members of Congress are not always
aware of what is in the bills on which they vote).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 117–44.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 117–44.
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25

viewpoints may react to their action. The best argument that
Congress should control in questions of federalism is that members of
Congress, unlike agency personnel, are directly elected. This
argument is ultimately unpersuasive, however, because political
oversight creates strong incentives for agencies to avoid actions that
are at odds with popular sentiment. Moreover, Congress has its own
weaknesses, such as a propensity to enact legislation that benefits one
region at the expense of many others.
Turning to the claim that agencies can enact rules too easily, we
argue not that all agency rulemaking is difficult, but rather that the
degree of difficulty that courts should demand can vary. Courts justify
frustrating congressional efforts to enact legislation or to delegate
authority to agencies as necessary to protect underlying constitutional
values that the enactment or delegation might infringe. But the need
to defend a value depends on the force of the constitutional concern,
the extent to which a particular piece of legislation threatens a
constitutional value, and the degree to which other rules already
protect that value. Such protection could take the form of either
direct judicial constitutional enforcement or the increased
transparency and deliberation that we argue comes from agency
consideration of the constitutional value. Many of these
considerations depend on the kind of policy judgments at which
agencies are most skilled. A uniform rule prohibiting all but very
clearly authorized agency actions does not accurately reflect the
complexity of these underlying tradeoffs. Our more nuanced
balancing test, although perhaps more complex, is also much truer to
the spirit both of the Constitution and the realist core of
administrative law.
Thus, we conclude that any doctrinal trend toward requiring in
all cases clear congressional authorization for preemption or other
expansions of federal power is mistaken. The underlying justifications
for these clear statement rules would at best be relevant in only a
small fraction of all agency decisions to preempt or regulate at the
outer limits of federal authority—although, as we concede, they

25. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 517 (2002) (stating that uncertainty about
reviewing judges is a necessary antidote to agencies tailoring their decisions to a particular
ideology).
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would justify rejecting certain controversial agency preemption
26
claims.
Part I of this Article explains federalism and the realist balancing
that underlies its modern judicial enforcement. We conclude that
more demanding rules for agency expansions of federal power are
sensible only to the extent that agencies are less capable than other
branches of reaching the best balancing of federalism interests.
Accordingly, Part II compares the performance of the different
branches
on
several
important
metrics—transparency,
deliberativeness, and accountability. In Part III we set out our
argument that although agency rulemaking may be easier than
legislation, ease alone does not justify greater resistance to
rulemaking to resolve federalism issues, especially in those cases in
which federal intervention is consistent with federalism values. Part
IV applies the lessons of our earlier analysis to preemption and
nondelegation and to the specific examples of federal preemption of
local chemical plant safety laws and federal regulation of local
wetlands.
I. FEDERALISM AND RESISTANCE NORMS
Although the foundational statute of the administrative state, the
27
Administrative Procedure Act, offers little direct guidance about
federal-state relations, federal agencies are hemmed in on all sides by
federalism. The Constitution’s text and structure embody a respect
for state autonomy, or at least a respect for the benefits presumably
28
derived from having politically independent states.
In this respect there is really not one federalism but two. One
form, which some commentators have termed “abstract federalism,”
29
can be thought of as political or rights oriented. In this conception,

26. As our emphasis on the agency’s choice to preempt suggests, we take no position here
on preemption in situations in which an agency has not evinced some intent to preempt.
27. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
28. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (noting that the two main arguments
against preemption are the importance of federalism in the “American constitutional scheme”
and in nationwide efficiency).
29. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741 (2004)
(“[F]ederalism values, such as ensuring core state regulatory authority and autonomy, are
important and can be protected through political processes.”); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation and There Is One, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 611, 613
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federalism preserves the states as a source of power that rivals the
federal government, so that competition between the two for the
loyalty of the public constrains any tendency toward tyranny or other
30
bad behavior. The second, economic, conception values federalism
because—and only to the extent that—it may tend to increase overall
31
national welfare or utility.
Under either theory, there are few direct constitutional limits on
32
the power of the national government. For a variety of familiar
reasons, federal courts are reluctant directly to invoke the
33
Constitution in curtailing the power of their coordinate branches.
For example, state autonomy is not always an unmitigated good, and
courts may not be particularly well suited for answering the question
of how best to balance competing interests, many of which may shift
34
over time.
The courts have supplemented outright constitutional
invalidation with a sort of second-best set of constitutional
(2002) (criticizing abstract federalism as “divorced from how power is actually exercised, shared
and constrained”).
30. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (2006); Hills, supra note 28, at 4, 25;
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L REV. 1, 63 (2004).
31. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1121–23
(1999); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism 3 (U. Ill. Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. LE 06-001, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=875626; see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns
preserves to the people numerous advantages.”). For the classic critique of this argument in
favor of federalism, see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
32. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 451–61, 474–85, 490–91 (2002) (outlining an evolution of
doctrine in which, other than protections against federally created claims for money damages,
constitutional doctrine per se does little to restrict federal power, but noting that
subconstitutional federalism-promoting doctrines are more extensive); see also Vicki C.
Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience,
51 DUKE L.J. 223, 280 (2001) (“[T]he Court’s record of activism on behalf of the states as
against national power is neither impressive nor durable.”); Mark Tushnet, Judicial
Enforcement of Federalist-Based Constitutional Limitations: Some Skeptical Comparative
Observations, 57 EMORY L.J. 135, 143 n.28 (2008) (“The so-called ‘federalism revolution’ of the
1990s was on its own terms quite modest, and even that revolution appears to have been
limited . . . .”).
33. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–52 (1985). Garcia
famously rejected an earlier and more aggressive approach to judicial enforcement of federalism
norms on the grounds that there are other avenues for defending those norms, that judges are
poorly equipped to reach correct decisions, and that courts only have a remote connection to
popular preferences for a given outcome. Id.
34. See id.
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limitations—what Professor Ernest Young has termed “resistance
35
norms.” What the courts do, in effect, is to make it more difficult for
other actors to achieve ends the courts think infringe on
constitutional values. Because resistance norms take the form of
statutory interpretation, they can be overridden, albeit at some cost,
36
within the ordinary political process. The fact that these resistance
decisions are subject to political revision has several benefits: it
lowers the danger of highly countermajoritarian holdings, it increases
the ease with which courts may foster deliberation and invite political
actors into their own decisional processes, and it perhaps expands
37
courts’ institutional capacity to do other work.
Thus, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has done much of
its work in protecting the values of federalism not through outright
invalidation but rather through a variety of statutory presumptions
38
against federal power. Congress cannot diminish the core of state
39
40
power, approach the constitutional boundaries of its authority, or
41
subject states to any kind of private liability unless it does so through
extraordinarily clear language. Courts must read conditions attached
42
to federal grants to states strictly against the federal government.
And, when federal and state law conflict, courts must begin with the
43
presumption that the federal legislation does not preempt state law.

35. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000) (defining “resistance norms” as
“constitutional rules that raise obstacles to particular governmental actions without barring
those actions entirely”).
36. Id. at 1552 (noting that resistance norms “may . . . [yield] to governmental action,
depending on the strength of the government’s interest, the degree of institutional support for
the challenged action, or the clarity of purpose that the legislature has expressed”).
37. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 242–43, 252–53; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 88 (1996); Young, supra note 35, at 1606–08. That is, if cooperative decisions lower
popular resistance to the Court as a whole, they may allow the Court to be more effective even
when it acts alone.
38. Sharkey, supra note 2, at 252 n.126.
39. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991).
40. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–82 (2005).
41. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
42. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2006); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
43. For careful examinations of the evolution of the presumption, see Professor Mary
Davis’s discussion of preemption in the context of food and drug regulation, Mary J. Davis, The
Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1111–32
(2007), and Professor Allison Eid’s description of the Court’s “[p]resumption against
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All of these rules have a resistance norm effect—although they do not
outright prohibit federal expansions, they make it more difficult for
the federal government to displace state power.
These presumptions are especially potent as against federal
agencies. Although Congress can, with sufficiently clear language,
press up against the outer bounds of its authority to displace the
states, the executive branch cannot do so on its own. Any regulation
that raises constitutional doubts is invalid unless Congress clearly
44
authorized that result. We term that view the SWANCC rule, after
45
the prominent decision applying it. Similarly, much as federal
statutes are presumed not to preempt state law absent clear language
to the contrary, Justice Stevens has argued, albeit thus far in dissent,
for a prohibition on any preemption by an agency unless expressly
46
authorized by Congress. And there is considerable doubt whether
other federalism-inspired clear statement rules, such as the rules
47
against private challenges to state action and the expansive reading
48
of conditional grants, can be satisfied by clear language supplied by
agencies.

[p]reemption” and commentators’ discussion of it, Allison H. Eid, Preemption and the
Federalism Five, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 32–37 (2005).
For an argument that the presumption against preemption should not be lumped together
with other forms of federalism-inspired interpretive principles, see Viet Dinh, Reassessing the
Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2092–97 (2000).
44. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 172 (2001); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (applying the rule that
agency regulations raising “grave and doubtful constitutional questions” are invalid but finding
no violation in the case).
45. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172–74.
46. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1579, 1585–86 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005) (holding, in a
majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, that a federal pesticide regulation scheme did not
preempt state common law damages claims that were “fully consistent with federal
requirements”). On some readings, there is even stronger authority for such a rule. See, e.g.,
Merrill, supra note 6, at 769 (arguing that in Gonzales, “[t]he Court observed . . . a delegation of
authority to an agency to promulgate standards for regulated entities does not entail ‘the
authority to decide the pre-emptive scope of the federal statute’ unless a separate delegation of
such authority is evident in the statute” (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 919
(2006))).
47. E.g., Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?
A Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 172 (2003) (summarizing doctrinal
uncertainty).
48. E.g., Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187,
1188–90 (2001) (noting that it is unclear whether clear agency regulations satisfy Pennhurst clear
statement rule).
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Commentators often overlook the extent to which these
resistance norms, like other forms of constitutional adjudication, are
matters of degree. As Professor Lawrence Sager explains, ordinary
constitutional decisions have evolved to comprise at least two
49
separate logical steps. First, the court must determine the content of
a constitutional norm; then it must determine to what extent that
50
norm will be enforced. By varying its levels of scrutiny, or, in the
model of Professor James Thayer and his twenty-first-century
51
followers, its degree of deference to others, a court can increase the
amount of political activity it will permit even if some of that activity
52
contravenes an idealized version of the constitutional norm. Indirect
constitutional reasoning of the kind we have just described is simply
an extension of this sliding scale. Thus, resistance norms, like all
constitutional judgments, call for the court to decide the importance
of the underlying norm, whom to protect it against, and how best that
protection can be achieved to the desired level. To make this last
judgment, courts must undertake a careful evaluation of the
53
incentives and behavior of the actors they wish to influence.

49. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221–26 (1978).
50. Id.
51. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). A number of latter-day scholars agree to some degree
with Thayer on this point. E.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 290–318 (1994); Steven D. Smith, Moral
Realism, Pluralistic Community, and the Judicial Imposition of Principle: A Comment on Perry,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 183, 192 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic
Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV.
245, 299–301 (1995).
52. Sager, supra note 49, at 1221–26; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1321–31 (2006) (surveying
different degrees of judicial scrutiny of political actors). Sager’s key example is the scope of
equal protection rights; as he observes, the Court had acknowledged that truly equal treatment
might impose one set of demands, but for institutional reasons, the Court opted to enforce
another, less imposing set instead. Sager, supra note 49, at 1217–18.
53. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 26–29
(1999) (arguing that empirical questions about the functioning of different branches are critical
in deciding how to allocate power of constitutional interpretation); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S.
Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1716 (2002) (“[S]ome legislative judgments on
fundamental values may be more trustworthy than others, and courts might be able to assist
Congress in this process.”); Mendelson, supra note 29, at 750–52 (“Nor does it fully resolve
normative difficulties to argue . . . that Congress, rather than the judiciary, will be the sole
decisionmaker on the value-laden question.”).
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Perhaps, then, the incremental protections that federalism
doctrine affords against agency action could be defended based on a
54
comparative analysis of institutions. If the executive branch is a
greater threat to state power, or otherwise is unable to fully cooperate
with courts, it ought to face greater resistance before it can act. We
are unaware of any comprehensive effort to make that case, and
indeed one of our aims for this project is to show that it is
unpersuasive.
Recently, though, several commentators have offered thoughtful
defenses of both the presumption against preemptive regulation and
the SWANCC rule. These defenses have been based on claims
regarding institutional behavior that in effect rely on the kind of
55
resistance analysis we have just set out. For example, Professor
Thomas Merrill argues that “Congress must expressly delegate
[preemption] authority [to the agency] in the language of the statute
56
itself.” He also notes that requiring clear congressional authorization
will result in greater deliberation before reducing state authority. This
would be the case, he writes, because there would then be two bodies,
57
rather than one, that would have to consider whether to preempt.
Similarly, Merrill elsewhere defends SWANCC, again claiming that
agencies expand federal authority too readily and with too little
58
consideration of the value of state autonomy.
Professor Merrill’s comments are typical of the bulk of the
commentary in the field. Several other leading commentators have
argued, like Merrill, that demanding a clear statement from Congress
is desirable because Congress’ deliberations about federalism will
59
likely be superior to those of an agency. For instance, Professor
54. When we do not expressly distinguish between them, our references to “federalism” in
this Article refer both to abstract and economic versions of federalism.
55. Bernard Bell, Interpreting and Enacting Statutes in the Constitution’s Shadows: An
Introduction, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 310–11 (2007); John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review
as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 946–47 (2001); Mendelson, supra note 29, at
742–43; Merrill, supra note 6, at 729–30; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 317;
Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848–50 (2005).
56. Merrill, supra note 6, at 767.
57. See id. at 772–73.
58. See Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, supra note 4, at 848–49 (arguing that
“[t]he Court was . . . correct to invalidate” the statute at issue in SWANCC because “Congress
never articulated an intention to permit regulation on that theory”).
59. Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism,
9 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 205, 221 (2001); Bell, supra note 55, at 310–11; Mendelson, supra
note 4, at 710–11, 718; Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2112–
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Sunstein describes the SWANCC rule as a form of “democracyforcing minimalism, designed to ensure that judgments are made by
60
the democratically preferable institution.” Others assert that,
because agencies can reach decisions without the series of veto gates
that slow Congress—majority votes, filibusters, bicameralism, and
presentment—it is appropriate for courts to limit agencies to that
61
power granted them expressly by Congress.
Finally, some authors have suggested a more formalist approach.
Professor Merrill notes, without developing an elaborate argument,
that in his view the text of Article I limits agency power to displace
62
state authority absent clear congressional authorization. Professor
Sunstein similarly does not defend formalism as such, but notes that
the formalist view of legislative power, under which Congress cannot
delegate its lawmaking authority to the executive, is most attractive in
those instances in which the executive approaches the limits of
63
Congress’s own power.
It is useful to emphasize the distinction between the questions we
address in this Article, which go to the authority of an agency to even
reach a decision, and the similar debate over the degree of deference
courts owe to such decisions. Many of the commentators we have
mentioned have addressed both questions, typically in very similar
64
terms. That is understandable; the modern notion of judicial
deference to executive decisions is grounded explicitly on
65
comparisons of institutional competence. But the fact that these

13. But cf. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 891–92 (2001) (arguing that avoidance does not enhance democracy
because it replaces the legislature’s views with the court’s).
60. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 335.
61. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 723–24; Merrill, supra note 6, at 750, 753–57; Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2112; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra
note 4, at 320.
62. Merrill, supra note 6, at 761–63. For a critique of Professor Merrill’s formalist
argument, see Gillian Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2061–65 (2008).
63. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 319. Professor Young has also argued
that courts should defend federalism out of fidelity to the Constitution, even if there is no strong
instrumentalist case in federalism’s favor. Young, supra note 55, at 1764–75.
64. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 698–99. But see Metzger, supra note 62, at 2030. Like
us, Professor Metzger emphasizes the role of administrative law in the determination of
federalism questions, id., though her specific approach and conclusions are somewhat different.
65. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); see
also Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs
Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 201 (2006) (arguing that the
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commentators have seen the two questions in essentially identical
terms suggests to us that something is missing. Institutional behavior
does not exist in a vacuum. Agencies, for instance, behave differently
depending on the rules courts set for review of agency
66
determinations. Thus, the relationship between deference and
institutional competence to handle federalism concerns is a dynamic
one; a change in deference rules may change how one ought to view
the prior question of bare agency authority.
Accordingly, our goal in the ensuing Parts is to evaluate the
relative competence of the three branches to best resolve federalism
questions, and to do so apart from but mindful of the correlative rules
for judicial review of the decisions of other branches. If it is true that
agency decisions should face higher resistance than those of Congress,
then one should be more sympathetic to rules that tend to reduce
agencies’ ability to expand federal power. We think, however, that
there is a more persuasive case in the opposite direction.
II. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO CONSIDER
FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN REGULATORY MATTERS
This Part presents an exercise in comparative institutional
competence. As we have set out in Part I, other commentators argue
that the role of agencies in determining the scope of federal power
should be minimized because of inherent limitations on the
executive’s capacity to take federalism concerns into account. For
example, these critics maintain that Congress is more democratic and
67
deliberative than are agencies. In our view these claims are rather
oversimplified. For each of the classic elements of representational
democracy—accountability, transparency, and deliberativeness—
agencies are in many contexts better suited to consider federalism
68
concerns than are Congress or the federal judiciary.

central question of which branch should resolve ambiguities in foreign affairs law is the
comparative competence of courts to the other branches of government).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 171–79.
67. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 716–17.
68. For a description of the relationship between accountability and representative
democracy, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 56 (1967).
Professor Mark Fenster argues that the work of philosophers Locke, Rousseau, Mill, Bentham,
Rawls, and Kant, as well as the founders of the United States, all support the contention that
“open government is an essential element of a functional liberal democracy.” Mark Fenster, The
Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895–96 (2006); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
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At the outset, it deserves mention that this Article views the aims
of federalism, whether in its abstract or economic sense, as improving
the regulatory process, not the preservation of state regulatory
prerogatives per se. Hence, the issue is not which institution best
enables state influence over regulation, but rather which institution
fosters state influence that will enhance public welfare, and not
69
simply state officials’ opportunities for rent seeking. This view,
however, does not universally discount the value of having a
sovereign independent of the federal government with the power to
regulate. Rather, it credits the availability of dual sovereignty only as
a functional matter—that is, only when that availability is related to
regulatory outcomes and not simply out of some posited formalistic
preference for protection of dual sovereignty.
A. Transparency of Legislative, Judicial and Federal Administrative
Processes
Transparency refers to the ease with which the public can discern
both the outcome of legal decisions and the inputs that lead to such
70
decisions. Outside of a few areas in which government maintains the
secrecy of its operations, such as national security, the ultimate
outcome of decisions by all branches of the U.S. government is made
71
public. The same is not true, however, about the processes that lead
to those decisions. Transparency of process depends on the ability of
the public to know that an issue is being considered, to be involved in
the decisionmaking process, to know who else is involved and in what
ways, and to understand how a final decision is reached.
1. Congressional Transparency. Commentators often assert
72
that Congress is the most transparent branch, and there is some
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1559 (1988) (noting that the framers of the
Constitution embraced the traditional republican belief in deliberation).
69. For more on the problem of rent seeking by public officials, see infra note 128 and
accompanying text.
70. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
WRIT SMALL 187 (2007) (labeling inputs and outputs as the two aspects of transparency);
Fenster, supra note 68, at 888 (defining transparency as “a governing institution’s openness to
the gaze of [the public]”).
71. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (requiring the executive
branch to provide information upon request unless the information falls within a particular
exemption).
72. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, Detaining Combatants by Law or by Order, 64 LA. L.
REV. 831, 832 n.5 (2004) (opining that Congress does not need procedures like those imposed
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merit to that intuition. Congress’s actions tend to attract media and
other public attention because Congress is the sole issuer of binding
legislative determinations, it acts less frequently than the collective
federal regulatory apparatus, and its processes are relatively common
knowledge. Accordingly, members of the public who track Congress
can learn what Congress is considering, at least once hearings are
scheduled or a bill is introduced. Moreover, acts of Congress not only
attract attention but also are accomplished by members meeting and
voting publicly, which would seem to add to transparency.
Nonetheless, some traits of the legislative process actually decrease
congressional transparency.
Although public awareness of congressional outcomes may be
high, the public is rather less informed about congressional processes.
73
Legislators often trade votes or vote strategically. For that reason, a
member of Congress’s voting record does not necessarily reflect how
the member stands on an issue. Members of Congress may vote
contrary to their preferences or those of their constituents on one
issue to ensure a vote from another legislator on a different and more
important issue. Similarly, members of Congress may vote on an
amendment to a bill that they do not really support to make the bill
less attractive to the median voter in Congress and thereby decrease
74
the likelihood that the entire bill will pass. Legislators may vote and
make statements meant to convince voters of their position on an
75
issue when their position actually may be more nuanced. By doing
on agencies because Congress’s “process is substantially transparent, it often allows for public
input, and its law is published”); David A. Wirth, The President, the Environment, and Foreign
Policy: The Globalization of Environmental Policy, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393,
403–04 (2004) (stating that Congress’s “normal law-making processes” are “designed to insure
the accountability and transparency of the legislative process”); Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure
These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 953 &
n.40 (2005) (asserting that Congress’s “constitutional construction deliberations are more
transparent than those of judges”).
73. See Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 143 (2000) (“Legislators
can normally engage in logrolling, or perhaps rely on repeat play, to control strategic
behavior.”).
74. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 873, 905 (1987) (noting that strategic voting can mislead constituents who do not
recognize that the vote was not sincere). Proponents of Title VII opposed the addition of “sex”
to Title VII’s provisions, seeing it as a strategic ploy to defeat the entire bill. See, e.g., 110 CONG.
REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 2581–82 (statement of Rep. Green). This led
to the anomalous situation that many representatives who voted for Title VII opposed the
amendment that became part of the statute. Id.
75. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 (1994);
Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1744; Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States
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so, the legislator may hope to avoid a negative reaction from voters
while maintaining support from individuals and entities who are large
campaign donors and who can more accurately assess the actual
76
position of the legislator.
Additionally, the mechanisms by which Congress reaches
decisions are relatively obscured from public view. Conference
committee meetings—perhaps the most crucial of all the steps leading
77
to enactment—are not meaningfully open to the public. It is true
that the antecedent hearings, testimony, and debate are publically
available, even if they are of low salience. But ultimately, individual
legislators do not need to give an explanation for their votes, leaving
concerned voters uncertain how or when to hold their representatives
accountable.
Thus, although voters may be aware of the general behavior of
Congress, they may not have sufficient information to monitor the
behavior of any particular legislator. This point implies that the
legislative process is conducive to opacity. It also creates the potential
for differential transparency because the public and more diffuse
interest groups are often less able to discern the true machinations of
78
legislators’ actions than are focused interest groups. Further, it may
be in the interest of members of Congress to manipulate this
79
differential opacity, at least for some issues. Consistent with public

Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143, 166–67 (1992) (noting that ordinary legislative
processes are not as transparent as some assume because of opportunities for members of
Congress to engage in obfuscatory tactics).
76. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the
Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 546 (1998) (describing how legislatures can
adopt statutes that satisfy public demand for symbolic action while appeasing special interest
demand for concrete benefits).
77. Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1733. For a discussion of the importance of the
conference committee and reports, see ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 62–64
(1997).
78. Sophisticated repeat players who interact directly with members of Congress and their
staffs are more likely to learn of and understand the motivations behind legislators’ votes than
are members of the general public. See Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Corporate
Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 41, 45 (2005) (concluding that a special interest group is able to develop more accurate
information about how a legislator will act the longer the legislator serves on a committee
relevant to the group).
79. See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen Legislator, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 623, 686–87 (1996) (describing the economic theory of legislation that would
predict such manipulation); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227–29
(1986) (same). The economic theory of legislation views the legislative process as aimed at
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choice critiques of the government, this differential opacity gives
focused interest groups greater influence than they are entitled to
under a theory of representative democracy that counts the interests
80
of each citizen equally.
States, however, generally are well represented on Capitol Hill,
81
and their lobbyists have access to legislators. Hence, a possible
implication of the public choice concern is that the legislature may be
too protective of state interests vis-à-vis the public interest. To the
extent that states’ interests in sovereign autonomy compete with the
interests of other well-organized groups, however, states’ undue
82
advantage may be eliminated.
In short, congressional transparency is only skin deep. If
83
transparency is to have any purpose other than as an end in itself, it
must be a mechanism for voters to gather information necessary to
their own participation in the political process. On that measure, the
public’s window into Congress looks fairly clouded.
2. Judicial Transparency. At the outset, judicial matters may
attract less attention than legislative matters. The public may not be
aware that a court is considering a matter that has not already
attracted public attention prior to judicial consideration. If, however,
a federal circuit court decides to consider a case en banc, and even
more so if the Supreme Court decides to consider a case, that case
will often attract the attention of the media and consequently general
public. Although Supreme Court cases involving issues of federalism

providing rents to special interest groups that then repay legislators with support for their
reelection. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION, at x (1997) (noting that the book “explains how
political extortion via ‘rent extraction’ figures in politicians’ maximization of their own welfare
personally, to the detriment of society generally”); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and
Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987) (noting
ways that politicians can actively seek rents from private actors).
80. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate
and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1139 (1997) (describing how
informational advantages give focused interest groups an advantage over the general public in
securing favorable legislative outcomes).
81. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 762–63.
82. Hills, supra note 28, at 5–6. Whether states’ interests are over- or underrepresented in
terms of accepted theories of democracy is an empirical question. We explore that question in
more depth in Part II.B.
83. Fenster, supra note 68, at 895–902 (detailing the benefits of transparency for democracy
as well as other instrumental benefits).
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are likely well covered by the media, similar cases in the lower
courts may escape media and public attention simply because of the
large number of potential decisions and their smaller jurisdictional
reach. Of course, lower court cases that have national significance
often do attract significant media attention.
Independent of public awareness of federalism issues decided by
lower courts, those who are interested can discern how individual
judges vote on cases because votes are publicly announced.
Moreover, each judge either writes or signs onto an opinion that at
least purports to explain the judge’s decision in the case. Hence,
judicial decisionmaking, unlike congressional action, seems to be
highly transparent in that those who wish to influence judicial
decisions can readily ascertain the grounds on which they must
engage the court.
On the other hand, the actual conferences at which judges vote
are not open to the public; even if they were, only the judge knows
what actually motivates that judge to vote one way or another on a
particular case. Legal academics are fond of accusing judges of being
result oriented—essentially of caring about which outcome they
85
prefer rather than which decision the law requires. From this
accusation, one might surmise that one cannot rely on a judge’s
opinion to give any meaningful insight into that judge’s position on
the law. But such an inference is unjustifiably pessimistic for at least
two reasons.
First, judges get some satisfaction from engaging in their craft.
That craft involves discerning the law established prior to any
particular case and determining how it is best interpreted and applied
to the particular case. Under prevailing norms, it appears that if
judges want to be recognized (by others as well as by themselves) as

84. Metzger, supra note 62, at 2106–07; see also Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, supra note 4, at 2088 (suggesting that “administrators are in a far better position” to
deal with changing circumstances than courts or the legislature); cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,
Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 485 (2005) (claiming that empirical
evidence supports the notion that the notice-and-comment process changes regulatory
outcomes).
85. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stephanie Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial
Activism, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1752, 1766 (2007) (“There is considerable empirical support for
claims that the Supreme Court has engaged in result-oriented judging.”); see also Jesse Choper,
Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 335, 346 n.44 (2001) (citing numerous legal scholars who accused the Supreme
Court of being result oriented in deciding Bush v. Gore, 591 U.S. 98 (2000)).
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skilled legal craftsmen, they must give reasons for outcomes that are
86
cogent to both author and audience.
Second, even if one were to attribute outcome-preference
motives to a judge, the opinion the judge writes would still articulate
legal principles and advance the law in a way the judge prefers. Law is
built on precedent. Accordingly, a judge who favors a particular
outcome in a case can make it more likely that judges in future cases
87
raising similar issues will decide those cases as the first judge would.
Because of these motivations, the judicial process seems to be
relatively transparent.
If the ultimate goal of transparency is to assure some sort of
democratic accountability, transparency might be less meaningful
because federal judges are appointed and protected by lifetime
tenure. Judicial transparency, however, is not irrelevant. Even if the
public’s opinion about the judge’s performance does not influence
that judge, it influences the judicial system as a whole. On an issue
like federalism, if resistance norms created by the courts are not too
great, the legislature can overrule any judicial decision that proves
sufficiently unpopular. If resistance norms are effective at deterring
legislation, a deviation of judges’ legal preferences from those of the
polity could still stimulate the appointment of future judges whose
views accord with those of the polity. Transparency therefore does
permit the public to better influence the judiciary or to enact
legislation that constrains the influence of courts. Finally, of course,
actual litigants can use the information in judicial opinions.
3. Agency Transparency. Agency proceedings are more
transparent than intuition might suggest. The public may not be
aware of every agency proceeding that potentially could affect the

86. Craft is related to wanting to succeed in one’s own eyes as well as others’ at the “game”
of judging. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 28–29 (2003) (discussing how, among
other things, judges value playing the game of judging); see also Brian Galle, The Justice of
Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive Claims of Independent Authority to Interpret the
Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157, 212–13, 222–23 (2005) (arguing that modern norms of
judging oblige judges to defend their opinions based on reasoned and internally consistent
elaborations from existing law); Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its
Public Perceptions, and the Role of Scholars, 95 CAL L. REV. 1619, 1628–29 (2007) (discussing
the role of judicial craft in helping the courts maintain their perceived legitimacy).
87. See Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 326, 326 (2007) (modeling legal doctrine as a means for higher courts to
constrain the discretion of lower courts).
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allocation of sovereign power between states and the federal
88
government. Agency decisions affecting federalism values, however,
usually are made as part of legislative rulemaking proceedings. These
proceedings are more salient than formal adjudications and informal
agency proceedings and are governed by procedures that facilitate
89
public awareness of the matter. By Executive Order, the president
requires every agency to include in the Unified Regulatory Agenda of
the United States an agency regulatory agenda providing both a brief
summary and contact information for “all regulations under
90
development or review” by that agency. The Unified Regulatory
Agenda also includes every agency’s “Regulatory Plan . . . of the most
important significant regulatory actions that the agency reasonably
expects to issue in proposed or final form in that fiscal year or
91
thereafter.” Once an agency is ready to propose a rule, the
Administrative Procedure Act as well as other statutes and Executive
Orders impose numerous procedural constraints on agency
rulemaking that further increase the visibility of the rulemaking
92
process.
Before adopting a rule, an agency must notice its intent to do so
93
in the federal register and identify the subject of the regulation. For
most rules, the agency actually proposes a specific rule as part of its
94
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) Any interested person can

88. Cary Coglianese & Margaret Howard, Getting the Message Out: Regulatory Policy and
the Press, 3 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 39, 40–41 (1998) (noting how the press tends not to
cover regulatory politics).
89. Agencies potentially could affect federalism values through adjudication and guidance
documents, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), 554 (2006), although the more limited reach and force of
such actions compared to legislative rules decreases the prospect of agencies using them to
affect federalism values. In any case, we suggest that courts should be more hesitant to allow
agencies to interfere with state regulatory prerogatives through these processes because they are
less transparent, deliberative, and politically accountable. See infra note 310 and accompanying
text.
90. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
91. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c), 3 C.F.R. at 641 (as amended by Exec. Order 13,422 § 4,
72 Fed. Reg. 2,763, 2,764 (Jan. 18, 2007)).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing for notice in the federal register, a public comment period,
and publication in the federal register of a final rule thirty days prior to its taking effect); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 533, 533–35 (2000).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
94. See Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 856, 892 (2007) (“A typical notice of proposed rulemaking today contains extensive
background on the agency’s activity prior to issuing the notice, a summary of the evidence in the
agency’s possession and what it hopes to acquire during the rulemaking, and a proposed rule.”).
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95

then comment on the NOPR. In the NOPR, the agency must reveal
information on which it relied in formulating the proposed rule to
ensure that the public has a meaningful opportunity to comment on
96
the rule. Likewise, if a private person provides information to or
otherwise communicates with an agency about a proposed rule
outside of the notice-and-comment process, the agency generally
documents the ex parte contact and makes the information and a
summary of the communications available as part of the rulemaking
97
docket.
Public awareness of a rule and the agency process for developing
it before the rule is formally proposed is a crucial component to
administrative transparency. By the time an agency issues an NOPR,
it has already invested much time and effort in developing the
proposed rule and often does not change it in fundamental ways in
98
response to comments. Thus, public awareness at the time the
agency issues the notice of proposed rulemaking may be too late.
Generally, an agency considering whether to propose a rule appoints
99
a team of staff members to formulate the proposed rule. Team
members, each with different professional backgrounds and contacts
outside the agency, collect and filter information within their ambit of
expertise. By the time a potential rulemaking proposal reaches an
agency head, the agency has amassed considerable information, the
alternative avenues for action have narrowed, and the arguments that
the agency presents to the agency head regarding the proposal have

95. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
96. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the
Administrative Procedure Act “requires an agency to make available to the public, in a form
that allows for meaningful comment, the data the agency used to develop the proposed rule”);
see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V: A Response to
Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 903 (2007).
97. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 323 (2004).
98. See Cuéllar, supra note 85, at 424–25 (discussing agency responses to public comments);
E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992) (noting that the
function of notice-and-comment rulemaking has shifted from providing information to the
agency to creating a record for judicial review); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory
Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 621–23 (2002)
(presenting a psychological explanation for agencies “locking in” rules prior to the comment
period).
99. Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 90–91 (Autumn 1991) (describing the “team model” of rulemaking at the
EPA); Seidenfeld, supra note 25, at 527–28 (calling the team model “[t]he idealized
embodiment of the [agency] work group”).
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largely been developed. Thus, well before an agency proposes a rule,
awareness that the agency is developing the rule is a crucial
component of administrative transparency.
Even prior to the issuance of the NOPR, however, agency
processes are relatively transparent. Representatives of interest
groups, even those with diffuse interests, do have access to the staff
100
members in each of the offices represented on a rulemaking team.
Each office is likely to have different professional training and norms,
different perspectives, and different constituents outside the agency
with whom they communicate about what is occurring in the agency.
Thus, agency economists may communicate with economists outside
the agency regarding economic issues that a possible rulemaking
raises; the same is true for engineers, environmentalists, health
scientists, and virtually every profession from which a member of the
rulemaking team comes. As with the legislative process, repeat
players in the policy formulation process who have the ear of agency
101
staff generally know what the agency is considering. These players
can provide input into the rulemaking process even at a very early
102
stage.
Presidents dating back to Reagan have issued executive orders
that, although intended to increase the president’s power to oversee
agency policymaking, have also opened the rulemaking process to
103
public scrutiny. Thus, in addition to their Regulatory Plan, agencies
must file a host of analyses and reports with the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) on such matters as the costs and
104
benefits of rules. Much of the interaction between the agency and

100. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 463 (1999) (noting that awareness of interest group politics
has facilitated access to agencies by representatives of diffuse interests); Wendy E. Wagner,
Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 283 n.358 (“Accessing
members of Congress can be much more difficult than communicating lay concerns to
bureaucrats.”).
101. See Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55
DUKE L.J. 943, 949–50, 965 (2006).
102. Id.
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Regulatory plans are incorporated into the
Unified Regulatory Agenda that the Office of the Federal Register National Archives and
Records Administration publishes biannually. The Unified Regulatory Agendas are available
online. U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, Unified Agenda: Main Page, http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/ua/index.html (last visited May 31, 2008).
104. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is part of the president’s
Office of Management and Budget and is responsible for monitoring agency compliance with
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105

OIRA is made public. In addition, agencies are subject to Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which require that the agency
reveal to a requester any information that it maintains in its records
unless the information comes within one of the limited exceptions
106
provided by FOIA. Although FOIA does not require an agency to
reveal its plans and strategy regarding future action, one can often
glean from information in the agency records just where an agency is
headed on a particular issue.
Despite these mechanisms that increase the transparency of
agency decisionmaking, the rulemaking process does create some
barriers to transparency. As we have noted, proposed rules are
formulated early in the process, prior to any statutory requirements
for public involvement. The formulation of rulemaking is a complex
process that involves staff members from various agency offices and
potentially complex interactions with politically appointed agency
107
managers. Thus, as in the legislative process, the potential for
confusion and obfuscation by the agency about who is responsible for
what aspects of an agency rule is significant. Although the rulemaking
process provides critical early stage access for some constituents, it
does restrict access for others who are not as well organized and
108
connected.
Nonetheless, the agency process likely is more transparent than
the legislative process primarily because the costs of gaining access to
agency staff members who can explain the agency’s deliberations is
109
lower than the cost to gain access to legislators. The obstacles to
gaining access to members of Congress stem in large part from

requirements imposed under various Executive Orders. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(d),
3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
105. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 828 (2003) (discussing how OIRA is required to publish
details about all substantial oral communications between OIRA personnel and outside
parties).
106. 5 U.S.C § 552 (2006).
107. See Coglianese, supra note 102, at 949–52.
108. See Cuéllar, supra note 85, at 414–15 (observing that some scholars have found that the
notice-and-comment process often fails to include concerns of the “lay public”).
109. Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781 (1999) (“[T]he costs of participating in the rulemaking and more
informal agency processes, where many of the most important policy choices are in fact made,
are likely to be lower than the costs of lobbying or otherwise seeking to influence Congress.”).
The term “agency deliberations” refers to considerations of the various offices in the
decisionmaking process rather than the thought processes of the agency head.
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members’ wide portfolio of matters under consideration. Members
of Congress also spend a majority of their time doing constituent
111
service and fundraising. The implication of these two realities is that
members of Congress and their personal staff have little time to meet
with individual members of the public or representatives of diffuse
interest groups to discuss general substantive policy.
Congressional committee staff members may be more accessible
than members or personal staff, but they lack the expertise and
112
professional connections of agency staff. And although committee
staff members are technically in the employ of their committee,
members of Congress generally hire the committee staff, with the
number of staff positions varying depending on which party is in
113
power. Committee staff members thus have an incentive structure
similar to that of legislators, so that they too are focused on reelection
and party supremacy. If they seek or grant outside access, they do so
largely to the extent that it advances those ends. In contrast, as a
career bureaucrat, an agency staff member on a rulemaking team
generally focuses on one particular aspect of a rulemaking, has
already established a network of professional relationships, and does
not have to spend time protecting a boss who is constantly seeking
114
reelection.
110. See Cuéllar, supra note 85, at 420 n.31 (“Legislators must vote on foreign policy,
campaign among their constituencies, evaluate tax law changes, and supervise staff. They cannot
afford to supervise every regulatory development, so they must develop techniques for
deploying scarce attention and resources.”).
111. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT 44–45 (2d ed. 1989) (arguing that Congress delegates to agencies to stimulate
demand for constituent service); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1099, 1135 (2005) (describing how representatives use constituent service to gain political
support).
112. See Kathleen Clark, The Ethics of Representing Elected Representatives, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 35 (Spring 1998) (noting that Senate staff members “tend to have
responsibility for quite a wide range of issues, and therefore do not usually have the opportunity
to develop expertise in a particular subject area”). In correspondence, David Vladeck points out
that congressional staff’s lack of resources might be a basis for greater opportunities for
outsiders because Congress and its staff may be dependent on outside sources of information.
As we argue in the main text, though, any such access is likely to be selective and politically
driven. That suggests that individuals with viewpoints inconsistent with the members’ goals are
unlikely to obtain access.
113. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE,
RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 87–103 (1989) (reporting that party representation on
committees in each house is proportional to the percentage of seats the party controls in that
house of Congress).
114. For a description of the career bureaucrat, see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY:
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 118–19 (1989). For overviews of
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Agency staff members also have a greater incentive than their
legislative counterparts to encourage meaningful rather than merely
self-serving public access. Because Congress and the staff it directs
115
have no clear incentives to consider all relevant facts before acting,
any outside support Congress seeks for its conclusions will likely be
based on the members’ existing objectives instead of a real need for
information gathering. Often, these existing objectives will discourage
any access. For instance, as we have noted, members of Congress can
often use opacity about where they stand on certain issues to placate
voters while benefiting special interest groups that may make major
campaign contributions.
Conversely, agency staff members facing hard look judicial
review must know all the potential objections to a rule the agency is
proposing and obtain as much information about those objections as
possible to facilitate the defense of any rule if it is challenged in
116
court. For these reasons, access to the early stages of agency
formulations of rules, although not entirely open, probably is open to
a broader range of interest groups than are the behind the scenes
aspects of the legislative process. Moreover, because of the
availability of FOIA discovery, information about early steps in the
agency rulemaking process is more likely to be reported to the public
than is information about back room deals in the legislative process.

the professional networks to which career bureaucrats belong, see A. Grant Jordan, Iron
Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process, 1 J. PUB. POL’Y
95, 99–103 (1981); James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American Politics, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 319, 323–24 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1991).
115. See Galle, supra note 86, at 173–75 (claiming that reasoned deliberation in lawmaking is
a public good and therefore produces no political rewards for politicians).
116. See Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 564–65 (1997)
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review]. Hard look review requires that
agencies offer detailed explanations for their actions. The agency’s explanation must
address all factors relevant to the agency’s decision. A court may reverse a decision if
the agency fails to consider plausible alternative measures and explain why it rejected
these for the regulatory path it chose. If an agency route veers from the road laid
down by its precedents, it must justify the detour in light of changed external
circumstances or a changed view of its regulatory role that the agency can support
under its authorizing statute. The agency must allow broad participation in its
regulatory process and not disregard the views of any participants. In addition . . . ,
courts have, on occasion, . . . remand[ed] decisions that the judges believed the
agency failed to justify adequately in light of information in the administrative record.
Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (1997) [hereinafter
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification] (footnotes omitted).
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On balance, then, when it comes to federalism, agencies are the
most transparent of the branches. Although the public may be more
aware of statutes or Supreme Court decisions than of obscure federal
regulations, true transparency entails not only knowledge of
outcomes but also knowledge of the rationales on which
decisionmakers rely and the ability to influence the decisionmaker’s
deliberations. Here, agencies outperform their rivals, as they offer
more sources of insight about their decisionmaking as well as
information about how to influence it.
B. Deliberation of Congressional, Judicial and Administrative
Processes
To be deliberative, the decisionmaking processes of a
government institution must not simply translate preferences of the
relevant polity into outcomes as would an economic market. Rather,
outcomes must allow for self-reflection and changes in individual
117
preferences as a result of the decisionmaking process. Outcomes
must therefore reflect consideration of the interests of all affected
groups and a reasoned justification for why the decisionmaker weighs
those interests as it does in arriving at a final decision. In considering
interests, the decisionmaker should be receptive to the concerns of
various members of the public and should not weight some
preferences a priori as more deserving or important than others.
Ultimately, however, when deliberation is complete and the time
comes for action, the importance of an interest to the decisionmaking
process should increase with both the importance of the interest to
118
those who hold it and the number of individuals sharing the interest.

117. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 93,
135 (1996) (stating that the aim of the deliberative process is to “encourage [citizens] to discover
what aspects of [their first-order moral] beliefs could be accepted as principles and policies by
other citizens with whom they fundamentally disagree”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1529 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1549 (1988) (“[R]epublicans will attempt to
design political institutions that promote discussion and debate among the citizenry . . . .”).
118. This follows if the ultimate goal of deliberation is the maximization of societal welfare.
See Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of Markets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1750
(1999) (describing a voting system that allows for reflection of preferences in the aggregation of
votes as desirable in some aspects); Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POL.
ECON. 571, 572 (1959) (“Permitting the citizens who feel very strongly about an issue to
compensate those whose opinion is only feebly held can result in a great increase of the wellbeing of both groups, and prohibiting such transactions is to prohibit a movement toward the
optimum surface.”).
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1. Congressional Deliberation. The legislative process generally
is not as conducive to deliberation as it is to compromise and division
of spoils. These problems are exacerbated by the incentives at play in
decisions affecting state interests. And, in the federalism context, at
least, courts apparently have abandoned as fruitless attempts to force
legislatures to justify their outcomes in terms of effects on various
119
interests of the public.
a. Veto Gates, Logrolling, and the Structural Obstacles to
Deliberation. On individual issues, because of the multitude of veto
gates, legislative decisionmaking often results in no action when the
120
median voter would prefer some action. On other issues, however,
logrolling and vote trading allow Congress to pass laws that may not
121
reflect the preferences of the electorate. Both these outcomes are
inconsistent with deliberation’s aim of reaching results that are best
for the public.
Committee chairs and party leaders within each house of
Congress constitute one set of veto gates that are not necessarily
responsive to the preferences of the overall polity. Committee chair
control over legislative agendas can force a majority of legislators to
grant statutory favors to a minority of legislators who are well

119. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1710–11 (concluding that courts cannot
efficaciously require legislatures to justify their outcomes in a way similar to the justification
that courts require for administrative agencies); Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, supra
note 4, at 836–37 (arguing that Lopez really reflected a rejection of congressional findings as a
factor in the determination of the statute’s constitutionality); cf. United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 614–15 (2000) (rejecting Congress’s findings of impact on interstate commerce as
insufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the challenged legislation). Others argue that
because Congress is entitled to control over its own proceedings, efforts to direct congressional
deliberation are illegitimate. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100
MICH. L. REV. 80, 86–87 (2001); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The
Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 733 (1996)
(predicting that if the requirement for legislative findings becomes anything more than a
formality, it will “denigrate” the tripartite system of government).
120. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 (1995) (arguing that Congress is apt to
leave in place court holdings with which most legislators disagree rather than risk the political
costs and spend the time to reverse them); Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic Political Penalties: Why the
Public Would Lose Under the “Penalty Default Canon,” 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 724, 733–34
(2004).
121. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 936, 954–55 (1983) (contending that logrolling can “subvert[] the will of the majority”
(quoting Schmitz v. Younger, 577 P.2d 652, 655–56 (Cal. 1978)).
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122

situated to block consideration of an issue. Party leaders’ ability to
control the entire body’s agenda, and in the House of Representatives
123
to control voting procedures, provides them with similar influence.
There is evidence that members of Congress self-select committee
membership to afford themselves more influence over legislation that
124
their constituents and supporters find most important.
On the other hand, the fact that leaders and chairs are elected
and appointed, respectively, imposes limits on the extent to which
they can deliver such benefits. For instance, the legislative process
constrains committee chairs from providing the general body with
inaccurate information on bills because a committee chair who is
found repeatedly to provide inaccurate or incomplete material
information in a committee report may be removed. Such constraints
are themselves limited, however, because the large number of issues
that Congress faces at any one time makes monitoring of veto gates
imperfect at best. Further, the system does not seriously question
125
committee chairs’ entitlement to stop legislation they oppose. In
short, veto gates may result in too much influence for the interests
that support committee chairs’ and other legislative leaders’
preferences, which imposes costs on the national polity.
This combination of inertia and vote trading creates an
environment in which deliberation is scarce. Veto gates and
bicameralism can create legislative inertia that virtually obliges
legislators to engage in logrolling and vote trading to pass any
statutes. There are few obvious incentives for any individual
lawmaker to supply or demand a reasoned explanation for any given

122. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 543, 568 (2007) (describing one theory proposing that by “delegating power to
committee chairs, Congress gives them an incentive to invest in expertise, since committee
members also have greater control of legislative outcomes and thus can obtain extra rents that
justify the investment”); cf. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 759–63 (2005) (describing framework legislation as a means for
Congress to limit the power of committees with outlier preferences from acting contrary to the
preferences of the body as a whole).
123. See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1537–38 (2005) (describing the trend
toward greater party control over Congress’s agenda).
124. Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1076–77 (2001).
125. See Garrett, supra note 122, at 759–63 (describing framework legislation as a means for
Congress to limit the power of committees with outlier preferences from acting contrary to the
preferences of the body as a whole but noting the imperfection of these limitations).
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As a result, most legislation that Congress passes
outcome.
represents a compromise of coalitions rather than a consensus of all
127
legislators—a triumph of bargaining over deliberation. The opacity
of the logrolling system, which facilitates rent seeking and conceals
the absence of considered justifications, may further exacerbate this
128
tendency.
Thus, logrolling often enables legislation that is
129
unexplained and does not promote the public interest.
b. Legislative Deliberation about States’ Interests.
Having
discussed the nondeliberative influences of the legislative process, it is
enlightening to consider how states’ interests are likely to fare in that
process. Here we disagree somewhat with Professor Mendelson’s
thorough examination of congressional and executive consideration
of federalism. Mendelson argues that although both Congress and
agencies do an adequate job considering federalism interests with
130
national benefits, Congress is superior at considering local effects.
The structure of Congress, she claims, allows states’ influence to
131
protect their own interests.
126. See Galle, supra note 86, at 173–75 (claiming that reasoned deliberation in lawmaking is
a public good and therefore produces no political rewards for politicians).
127. Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1740–45; see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 119,
at 119 (“There are, in short, political dimensions when members of Congress promote, or
oppose, a given legislative proposal. The business of trying both to influence and to anticipate
the public makes for messy and unpredictable legislative history.”).
128. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
44–45 (1982); William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1235, 1240 (1973). But see Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative
Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 866–67 (2006) (noting that logrolling can decrease
transparency of legislation but opining that voters get cues from sophisticated political observers
who will not be confused by these practices). Rent seeking is conduct aimed at the transfer of
wealth rather than the creation of wealth. STEPHEN J. SPURR, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
LAW 26 (2006).
129. From a pluralist perspective, logrolling can be beneficial because it allows legislative
outcomes to reflect intensities of preferences. Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1323, 1343 (2000); Tomas J. Philipson & James M. Snyder, Jr., Equilibrium and Efficiency in an
Organized Vote Market, 89 PUB. CHOICE 245, 245 (1996). From a public choice perspective,
however, logrolling facilitates legislative action that is likely to represent a deal about how to
distribute monopoly rents. See Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial
Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 383 (“Log-rolling is condemned by
those who see the legislative process as a forum for rent-seeking by organized interest
groups . . . .”); see also Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch:
The New Logic of Collection Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1173 (2006) (“Logrolling among
members of Congress . . . mudd[ies] the trail of rent seeking.”).
130. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 768; see also Adler, supra note 59, at 221 (making the
same claim).
131. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 768.
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To the contrary, we think that Congress is unlikely to be a
consistent defender of local interests. Opportunities for rent seeking
give individual members of Congress incentive to enlarge federal
132
power. Such rent-extracting legislative activity is limited by the fact
that once Congress passes legislation, an agency invariably
implements the legislation, and therefore it is the threat of agency
action that creates the potential for political contributions. Hence, to
cash in the long-term rents generated, Congress would have to create
a regulatory structure in which it retained significant influence over
agency implementation of matters of importance to political
133
134
contributors. But this barrier hardly seems insuperable.
Another limitation on the rent-seeking incentive may arise if the
local interests at issue pertain uniquely to one state or region. State
lobbying in favor of general state prerogatives typically is weak as a
135
result of free-rider effects. When the positive externality from
defending state power is small, however, local interests may offer
their congressional representatives rents large enough to warrant
136
logrolling with others in Congress to defeat federal expansion. Note,
though, that these local rents would have to be so large as to buy out
the federalizing rent value of a national majority. We expect such
137
dramatic local interests will be relatively rare.

132. Hills, supra note 28, at 26–27.
133. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 24–25, 29–
30 (1999); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 211; cf. McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 129, at 1179 (noting that a
“salient feature” of rent extraction is that Congress will resist resolving the threat that allows it
to extract contributions).
134. See Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1420–23 (2007) (summarizing
tools for continuing congressional oversight of its delegates).
135. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 767–68. That is, as in public choice theory generally,
the fact that lobbying efforts by one state benefit all of them inclines each state to depend on the
efforts of others rather than expending its own resources.
136. Id. at 768. For example, Florida may have a strong enough interest in keeping its
beaches and waters in the Gulf of Mexico free from oil spills that it has sufficient incentives to
trade its support for legislation favored by members of Congress from other states for their
promises not to allow the federal government to issue oil leases for this region. More
generically, if a federal-expanding enactment would give member of congress A rents of ten, but
impose harms of one hundred on B’s district, B may be willing to offer A votes later that would
have present discounted value of greater than ten.
137. For instance, in our examples supra note 136, to obtain a majority vote in, say, the
Senate, B would have to offer total rents of at least 500—fifty times larger than the individual
gains from empire building. Florida’s members of Congress would have to agree to provide
rents to favorite entities of a majority of other legislators, which not only would cost Florida’s
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To the extent that local interests do triumph, they may do so at
the cost of the nationwide welfare. Local interests can just as easily
lobby to create or preserve the opportunity to export costs to their
138
neighbors as to defend their own prerogatives. This scenario is
especially plausible if the negative spillovers on other jurisdictions are
small and diffuse, so that there is little political reward for
139
representatives of other states in preventing them.
c. Problems with Congress Informing Itself and Acting on
Accurate Information. Finally, even if Congress does manage to
produce deliberative outcomes that reflect state influence, those
outcomes may quickly become obsolete. The legislative process
imposes large costs on collecting accurate information. Congress has
authority over all national matters, which significantly consumes
members’ time. Neither members nor their staff develop expertise
about programmatic details, and most generally do not come from
professions that could help inform them about the options for and the
implications of regulatory decisions. Congress therefore likely
depends on outsiders to gather information about the need to update
140
a statute. But, as we already noted, members of Congress and their
citizens greatly but also could result in its members of Congress being identified as regular
supporters of pork barrel legislation.
Congressional incentives for expansion may also be constrained if expansion carries other
costs for enacting members. For example, in the case of federal-power-expanding conditions
attached to federal grants, any enhancement of federal power necessarily reduces the funds
available for a legislator’s other projects. Because the grant recipient has the power to refuse a
grant and its attendant conditions, thereby driving up the size of the grant, conditional grants
may on balance be a very poor vehicle for obtaining greater legislative rents. Thus, in the
limited circumstance in which Congress cannot regulate directly due to constitutional restraints
and must depend on conditional spending, we would agree with Mendelson that local autonomy
is relatively safe from congressional expansions.
138. See Hills, supra note 28, at 26; McGinnis, supra note 55, at 926–27.
139. Professor Jide Nzelibe argues that legislative logrolling enhances national welfare,
claiming that lobbyists from the negatively affected area block efforts to redistribute from one
region to another. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial
Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1244–46 (2006). This analysis overlooks the possibility, as we
sketch in the text, that burdens may affect more than one region, raising the possibility that all
of the affected groups will remain passive in an attempt to free ride on one another. Moreover,
Professor Nzelibe’s claim assumes that the burdened regions are even aware of the burden;
again, we would expect individuals to free ride on the efforts of others in monitoring Congress
to ward against redistribution.
140. Cf. Arthur Lupia & Matthew McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and
Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 97–98, 112 (1994) (describing
congressional dependence on monitoring by outside groups in order to assure continuing
effectiveness of statutes).
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staffs have little incentive to ensure that the information they receive
141
is balanced or entirely accurate. Moreover, even outside groups face
the dilemma of either free riding on the efforts of others or spending
142
the costs to hold together an effective coalition.
The episodic nature of statutory enactment also impedes the
process of turning even the most recent information into updated
legislation. Congress may adopt legislation based on an assessment of
the impact of regulations that is accurate when it acts, but that
assessment becomes less accurate as time passes and Congress fails to
143
update the statute. Congress does have some ability to change the
interpretation of statutes in a more continuous manner than by
statutory amendment. It can do so by delegating a matter to a court
or agency and then influencing that agency or court by direct
144
oversight or through the appropriations process. Both of these
mechanisms, however, operate through an intermediary and hence
rely on a fairly broad delegation of the matter to the court or agency.
In sum, the costs of participation in the congressional process and the
barriers to translating that process into statutory enactments imply
that if the scope of states’ regulatory authority depends primarily on
Congress passing statutes, then the extent of that authority often
reflects an inaccurate or unduly broad assessment of the need for
federal authority.
2. Judicial Deliberation.
Judicial decisionmaking is the
quintessential example of a deliberative process. Judges explain their
decisions in written opinions. Explanations are based on law, which
includes precedents, binding texts, and reasoning about how those
sources of law bear on the issue presented to the court. The passions
that can drive either personal preferences of judges or the immediate

141. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
142. Cf. Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 571–72, 581 (1996).
143. See Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1024 (2006) (observing that
inaccuracy of legislative classifications is exacerbated as statutes age); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL L. REV. 953, 993 (1995) (noting that new developments make rules
anachronistic over time).
144. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 2 (1990); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign
Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 192 (“Holding
oversight hearings and threatening budget cuts present a far less difficult method to change
incorrect agency interpretations than does the enactment of specific override legislation.”);
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–67 (1984).
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demands of the polity are not directly relevant to the judicial process.
As the “least dangerous branch,” the judiciary depends on the
145
persuasiveness of its justifications under the law for its legitimacy.
Therefore the influence of the branch depends on the deliberative
nature of judicial decisions.
In terms of deliberative democracy, however, judicial
decisionmaking is wanting in several respects. Deliberative
democracy demands that the decisionmaker translate the values held
by the polity at some deep level into an outcome that is at least
acceptable to all (if not preferred by all) in terms of a broadly
146
conceived public interest. Because individual federal judges are
insulated from the pressures of politics, courts are well suited to make
decisions that avoid simply acquiescing to the impassioned demands
of a current majority. But judges’ political insulation and the reactive
nature of the judicial process equip courts poorly to ensure that their
decisions comport with well-established basic values of the public.
Court decisions can deviate from these basic values for two
reasons. First, the courts’ viewpoint is limited. A court’s duty is to
resolve a dispute between the parties, and the parties are unlikely to
represent all the various backgrounds and perspectives that may be
147
relevant to a determination. Although federalism cases often
involve a government litigant, it is unclear that a government attorney
litigating a particular case has more than a highly attenuated
connection to the views and interests of the public. Moreover, judges
tend to approach these issues from a legal perspective, which may
predispose them to overemphasize structural constitutional concerns
and to shortchange the pragmatic effects of the lines drawn in any
particular case. This structural emphasis is especially likely if the
148
judge sees making “law” as a unique aspect of the judicial role.

145. See Seidenfeld, supra note 117, at 1543 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 24–27 (1962); HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27–28 (1961)).
146. Id. at 1539 (expressing hope that civic republicanism will yield consensus).
147. Id. at 1544 (“Parties to litigation ordinarily do not adequately represent many
potentially affected interest groups.”).
148. Cf. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 691 (2007)
(“Unlike the judiciary, agencies implement their enabling acts with a combination of expertise,
practicality, interest-group input, and political will—not with a strictly legal, neutral, judicialstyle methodology that would be principally attentive to the text and structure of the
[controlling legal document].”).
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To the extent that a federalism issue arises solely out of the
meaning of a statute or the Constitution, courts frequently get input
from amicus briefs, which provide an avenue for nonparties with
differing perspectives to be heard. But even amicus briefs are limited
by the fact that an entity must first learn of the issue on which it
wishes to inform the courts of its view, and then must hire a lawyer to
write a brief on the issue. For matters that are sufficiently important
that they are heard by the Supreme Court, interested groups might
have enough interest to incur the costs of filing amicus briefs. In
lower courts, however, interest groups face both higher costs of
learning about relevant cases and lesser benefits of prevailing in those
cases. Therefore, the costs of participation relative to the potential
payoff from influencing the outcome of the case create a significant
barrier to participation.
In addition, the issues related to federalism involve more than
simply reading texts and legal precedents. Decisions about federalism
are often a choice of institutions—for example, a choice between
uniform federal regulation and more diverse but more complex and
149
costly state-by-state implementation. Choosing the best institution
to carry out policy or preserve rights is a complex policy judgment.
That judgment is informed not only by legal analyses but also by
technical knowledge relating to a regulatory program and political
knowledge about how various members of society will be affected by
150
the ultimate determination of whether and how states can regulate.
Further, amici do not participate in creating the record on which the
151
court must base its decision; therefore, participation as an amicus is
insufficient to provide the courts with all the relevant information
that various interest groups have to offer.
Second, courts are reactive, which can lead them to shortchange
152
the programmatic considerations related to federalism. To illustrate,
consider a situation in which it is unclear whether a statute authorizes

149. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 733 (illustrating a similar choice of institution in another
federalism context).
150. See Hills, supra note 28, at 6; McGinnis, supra note 55, at 949.
151. See Barbara M. Yarnold, Do Courts Respond to the Political Clout of Groups or to
Their Superior Litigation Resources/”Repeat Player” Status?, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 29, 31–32 (1995)
(reporting that interest groups prefer to bring cases rather than file amicus briefs because that
allows them to choose test cases and create the record for appeal).
152. See Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 323, 328 (2005) (“[B]ecause courts almost always play a reactive role, they lack
meaningful control of either the facts or legal issues before them.”).
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an agency to displace state law that would affect the agency’s
program. Suppose in addition that the courts had adopted the
153
position, suggested by some commentators, that an agency may not
displace state law unless the statute authorizing such action clearly
indicates that the agency has the authority to preempt. In such a
situation, the agency could not assert its authority to displace state
law because the statute is not sufficiently clear on the question until
the courts resolve its meaning. Therefore, the issue of whether
regulations under the statute displace state law would arise, if at all,
only through a case in which an entity adversely affected by state law
argues that the law is preempted by federal regulation.
One might argue that this is the preferred mechanism for raising
a regulatory preemption case because such cases usually arise in state
court. This avenue for raising the preemption issue therefore allows
state courts to clarify the bounds of state law, allowing the Supreme
154
Court to assess better whether preemption is warranted.
By the time a case is brought in state court, however, the
federalism decision will come too late for most entities. From a
federal agency’s perspective, the ideal shape of federal regulation
may depend on related state laws. For example, an agency that deems
uniformity of paramount importance—and would therefore prefer to
displace state law—would adopt different regulations if it could not
provide for such displacement than if it could be certain of
preemption. Similarly, deferring resolution of the preemption
decision to a court challenge may come too late for many regulated
entities; out of the fear of penalty under state law, these entities will
comply with that law even if they have a good faith belief that state
law has been preempted. If every entity subject to regulation
155
acquiesces, the federalism issue may never get to court at all.

153. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 707; Merrill, supra note 6, at 767.
154. Merrill, supra note 6, at 767.
155. Cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1985) (explaining that the
Court sometimes permits individuals “whose own speech or expressive conduct may be validly
prohibited or sanctioned” to facially challenge statutes that impose overbroad restraints on free
speech because “those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain
from doing so rather than risk prosecution”); Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing
of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency
Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 126–27 (1997) (arguing that if the penalty is sufficiently great, all
entities will comply with the rule even if its validity is suspect).
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3. Agency Deliberation. Agencies have the potential to be both
deliberative and responsive to political preferences, both because of
their relationship to the courts and the political branches and because
of their composition and the motivation of their staff members.
a. Strengths and Limitations on Agencies’ Abilities to Address
Constitutional Matters. Agencies have not to date explicitly focused
156
on federalism issues in most rulemakings. But under hard look
review, courts could demand that agencies include such analyses or
157
face reversal of a policy or rule. It is possible, as Professor
Mendelson suggests, that having agencies consider federalism values
would move decisions away from the best accommodation of state
158
and federal interests. We agree with Mendelson’s account with
respect to those aspects of federalism that accrue from the mere
availability of an alternative independent sovereign but that are
unrelated to the program that the agency regulates—what we term
159
“abstract federalism.” We think, however, that agencies are better
suited to consider all other aspects of federalism, and in our view
those other aspects are considerably more important.
Abstract federalism involves issues of general constitutional
structure, such as the desirability of maintaining a robust state
regulatory apparatus to counter potential power grabs by the federal
government that could threaten individual liberties. Such issues
involve an appreciation not only for the structure of the constitution
regarding state-federal relations, but also an appreciation of other
structural constraints on the federal government that the Constitution
mandates. Again, we concede that agencies are not experts in
factoring into their decisions the potential benefits of abstract
federalism—protection against tyranny by either sovereign—that are
unrelated to agencies’ programmatic mandates. The fear is that
agencies would simply get the evaluation of benefits wrong, or, worse,
would abuse consideration of abstract federalism by trotting it out to

156. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 782–83 (noting that agencies have not prepared
federalism impact analyses of rules as required by Executive Order).
157. See Metzger, supra note 62, at 2077–88 (suggesting that arbitrary and capricious review
be used to compel agencies to consider impacts of proposed regulation on states).
158. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 779.
159. Id. at 779–80; Mendelson, supra note 4, at 724–25; cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms,
Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 510 (2005) (doubting that agencies would be expert in
interpreting background constitutional norms).
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justify decisions made on nonlegitimate grounds such as partisan
160
politics. In essence, the impacts from the consideration of abstract
federalism are external to the agency program. Given that the agency
would not bear most of any costs it creates if it gets such
considerations wrong, the agency would have little motivation, absent
any incentives supplied by judicial doctrine, to ensure that it gets
161
these considerations right.
By not considering such benefits,
agencies would undervalue the instrumental benefits of abstract
federalism (especially compared to courts and the legislature). We
note, however, that there is a silver lining to this critique of the
limitations of agency considerations of abstract federalism: for the
same reason agencies would undervalue abstract federalism, they also
would be less likely than their legislative or judicial counterparts to
attribute some inherent, noninstrumental value to state autonomy
that might inflate the importance of federalism beyond what the
public interest justifies.
Simultaneously, however, courts are inferior to agencies in
factoring into their decisions the day-to-day impacts that autonomous
162
state regulators would have on a federal program. The agency is the
one familiar with the programmatic details and real-world
consequences of allowing competing sources of law on a regulatory
issue. Here, the abilities and motivations of the courts and the agency
are exactly reversed. Because courts are not well grounded in the
technical details of agency regulatory programs, they may fail to
comprehend the significance of state and local authority on the
effective implementation of an agency program. Moreover, although
courts are free to consider such impacts, it is the agency and not the
courts that would have to live with the day-to-day fallout from any
arrangement that incorporates local and state governmental
163
influences on a particular regulatory scheme. Accordingly, we do

160. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 781; Merrill, supra note 6, at 755–56.
161. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 781, 786; see also Hills, supra note 28, at 15 (doubting that
agencies give weight to abstract federalism values); Merrill, supra note 6, at 756 (same);
Metzger, supra note 62, at 2063–65 (noting arguments on both sides of the question).
162. Metzger, supra note 62, at 2062–63; Sharkey, supra note 21, 485–90.
163. David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 332 (1979) (observing that an agency’s immersion in
day-to-day administrative operations exposes to it the practical consequences of statutory
interpretation).
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not trust courts to take into account these considerations to the extent
164
warranted by the public interest.
Additionally, given that states retain viable regulatory capacity
over virtually all areas in which they have a legitimate interest, the
concerns that are the focus of abstract federalism are more remote
165
than programmatic federalism concerns. It seems a bit far-fetched to
think that states will not be sufficiently influential generally to
exercise their police powers. The states have proven to be effective at
166
influencing agencies to preserve their state prerogatives. More
specifically, “the expansion of federal power into areas that were
previously the exclusive province of the states has generally involved
167
the sharing of power between federal and state officials.” For
example, the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries
Service has authority essentially to engage in land use regulation
168
when approving “habitat conservation plans.” This authority has
resulted in “something akin to a collaborative local/federal land use
planning process” rather than simply replacing local land use
169
regulation.
On balance, then, the costs of shortchanging abstract federalism
in most cases will be small compared to the effect of federalism on
programmatic effectiveness. Hence, in most cases, we suspect that
agencies’ abilities to assess programmatic federalism values more
accurately than courts or Congress will outweigh any bias in their
federalism considerations, even if we assume that Congress is

164. One of us has observed that
[we] conceive the public interest as deriving from the fulfillment of the preferences of
a fully informed polity in a context that encourages consideration of the experiences
and interests of others. Although that fuzzy definition provides no operational
measure by which to determine which of several outcomes better serves the public
interest . . . [we] believe one can argue that certain outcomes clearly fall far outside
the public interest even without providing a precise operational measure.
Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 727 (footnote omitted).
165. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 31, at 930 (“The political power of the states, whether
cultural or constitutional in origin, is not under attack.”).
166. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 774–75.
167. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 31, at 934.
168. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 325, 350 (2002). But cf. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural
Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 195 (2005) (noting that habitat conservation plans
need not involve state or local government in what is essentially a bargain between the federal
government and private entities).
169. Doremus, supra note 169, at 350.
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170

unbiased. In essence, the other branches’ relative disadvantage in
deliberation means that their protections of federalism in any given
situation will vary greatly around voters’ preferred level of protection.
The assumption that Congress and courts are not biased only means
that such variations average to the preferred level of protection, but
the deviation for individual cases is likely to be large. In individual
cases, agencies frequently underprotect federalism values by a little,
171
whereas Congress either over- or underprotects them greatly.
Moreover, even if we are wrong in our conclusion that abstract
federalism is likely less important to the electorate than
programmatic federalism, it may still be the case that voters will
prefer some agency involvement in the selection of the level of
172
protection for federalism.
b. The Potential for Judicial and Political Oversight to Enhance
Deliberation about Federalism. Perhaps the most significant influence
on agency deliberation has been the prospect of judicial review and
increased political oversight of agency policymaking processes.
Courts demand that an agency give reasons for its decisions, forcing
the agency to explain its decisions in terms that do not simply reduce
to ideological or political preferences but rather can be connected to
173
legislatively specified criteria or broadly accepted public values.
This demand, along with demands from the political branches for

170. Based on our public choice critique applied to federalism issues, see supra notes 132–38
and accompanying text, we think that Congress is more likely biased in favor of well-organized
interest groups than are agencies. Because states are a well-organized interest group—one that
is even given a special preferential status as comprised of sovereign entities—there is a strong
likelihood that Congress is biased in favor of state interests, at least vis-à-vis more diffuse
interests. This adds to our preference for agency resolution of federalism issues.
171. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy 22 (Harvard
Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper No. 5, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=harvard/faculty (illustrating how slightly biased
outcomes are preferable to greatly variable but unbiased outcomes when the concern is the
average of each outcome’s distance from the ideal outcome). This point illustrates the
potentially misleading notions of information that averages supply. More accessible illustrations
include that when Bill Gates frequents a bar, the average wealth of patrons in the bar is
extremely high, but this says nothing about the wealth of the individuals in the bar.
172. See id. at 33 (proposing a model of federal regulatory decisionmaking in which
“majoritarian interests are often best served not by maximizing the influence of an electorally
accountable politician, but rather by ensuring a degree of bureaucratic insulation that makes
political control of agencies costly but not impossible”).
173. Richard J. Pierce, How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer:
A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 203–04 (2007); see also Metzger,
supra note 62, at 2036–40 (making this point about agency consideration of federalism).
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various types of regulatory analyses, has forced agencies to change
174
their structure. Most agencies are not populated by staff members
from one industry or profession that dominates the agency
decisionmaking process. Rather, to satisfy judicial review, agencies
need staff members from a multitude of professions who can
understand the views of all greatly affected interest groups.
Just as judicial review has prompted agencies to consider a
myriad of other concerns, courts can force agencies at least to
consider issues of federalism as part of judicial review for reasoned
175
decisionmaking. For example, contrary to some commentators’
views, courts do have ready standards on which to gauge agency
decisions, so that review is not simply a naked assertion of judicial
176
preferences. Recall that clear statement rules are meant to enforce
177
the Constitution.
Thus, the yardstick for measuring agency
deliberation on federalism values is the extent to which those
deliberations give proper regard to those substantive constitutional
norms the courts would choose if they were to enforce federalism
directly.
State courts may also influence administrative outcomes. For
many federalism issues, once an agency has decided the extent to
assert federal authority or to displace state authority, the reach of that
decision will arise through an action in state court. This allows the
states to have input in determining the precise bounds of the agency
determination. For example, an entity asserting that federal
regulation has displaced state law could raise that assertion as a
defense to enforcement of state law in a state administrative or
judicial proceeding. This allows states an opportunity to clarify both
how their laws operate and to communicate their regulatory interests

174. See generally Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in
Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997) (setting out the relationship between outside
influences, including judicial review, and internal agency decisions); Mathew D. McCubbins et
al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243
(1987) (same).
175. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44
(1983) (holding that an agency rule could only be upheld if the court concluded that it was the
product of reasoned decisionmaking); cf. Gersen, supra note 133, at 233 (noting that agencies
can develop expertise in preemption questions); Sharkey, supra note 2, at 256–58 (noting that
courts might condition deference to preemption decisions on compliance with measures aimed
at increasing state influence in the agency’s decisionmaking process).
176. For the contrary views, see Mendelson, supra note 29, at 794. For a detailed example of
this point in the discussion of preemption, see infra Part IV.A.3.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 32–43.
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in the context of a particular concrete controversy. Ultimately, state
courts can, and do, resist broad assertions of preemption by a federal
agency, forcing the agency to clarify the issue by subsequent action
178
(for example, a rule amendment or interpretive rule). In short, the
relationship between the agency and the federal system would
constrain the agency from dictating its view to states without any state
involvement and would facilitate a dialogue about the precise extent
of the need for state regulatory authority.
Judicial review also changes agency deliberation by changing the
makeup of agency personnel. Because the agency must demonstrate
its reasoned consideration of relevant issues, its staff includes a
professionally diverse corps of experts who generally share a norm of
179
nonpartisanship. That is not to say that agency decisions do not
reflect politics. But the politics reflected in an agency’s decisions
generally is dictated by the agency’s political overseers—Congress
and the president—either directly or through the political appointees
180
that head the agency. Professional agency staff members tend to see
their role as implementing programs consistently with the political
181
values of agency heads.
These factors support our view that, contrary to Professor
Mendelson’s suggestion, agencies ought to serve as the primary
institution for considering programmatic federalism values. Whatever
their skill at interpreting abstract federalism, agencies are well suited
for evaluating the benefits of both localism and the need for
182
experimenting within the programs they regulate. Agencies are

178. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in
Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1035–36 (2007)
(detailing one state court’s total lack of respect for an FDA preemption policy and explaining
why state courts are apt to be less deferential to federal agencies than federal courts).
179. See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 196–99 (1999); MARISSA MARTINO
GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE
REAGAN YEARS 155–56 (2000).
180. See GOLDEN, supra note 179, at 31–32 (describing how the Reagan “administrative
presidency” constrained bureaucrats to cooperate with the political agenda of agency heads).
181. See Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of
Judicial Review, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 22 & n.79, on file with
authors) (“[S]taff members in most agencies will act to support the policies of their politically
appointed overseers, whether or not the members agree with these policies.”).
182. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 920, 926 (arguing that the president is more likely than
Congress to maximize national welfare); Mendelson, supra note 29, at 788 (acknowledging
superior agency capabilities on this front); Metzger, supra note 62, at 2041 (noting avenues for
state influence on agencies).
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informed of the extent to which geographic variations warrant
different regulatory approaches, as well as the extent of problems
with all existing regulatory paradigms that might warrant using states
as laboratories to develop new approaches. In addition, the agency is
keenly aware of the potential for state regulation to interfere with its
federal regulatory program. Courts, Congress, and the president do
not have a sufficiently intricate understanding of federal regulatory
programs to fully appreciate the potential costs of lack of uniformity
or of local resistance to federal regulatory policy.
Nor do states often strike the right federalism balance. States
tend to want to expand their own power and autonomy even when
183
uniformity or less spillover would be theoretically preferable.
Allowing agencies to evaluate federalism issues, coupled with a
demand by courts that agencies deliberate and explicitly give reasons
for any federalism decisions they make, thus promises to factor
programmatic federalism values more accurately into regulatory
decisions than would reliance on the legislature and courts to make
such decisions.
One might reason that courts can factor agency input about
programmatic federalism values into their decisions and therefore
that courts should be the institution ultimately responsible for
deciding how to accommodate states’ interests in federal regulatory
programs. But the relationship between courts and agencies is not
symmetrical. Unlike agencies, courts not only have limited knowledge
of pragmatic day-to-day concerns about federal regulatory programs,
but they also have little incentive to pay sufficient heed to such
184
concerns.
Administrative deliberation is also enhanced by the various types
of analyses that the president and Congress require agencies to
perform. Executive orders require agencies to consider a variety of
impacts—the most noted of which mandates cost-benefit analyses for

183. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 98–99 (1994) (arguing that local jurisdictions will self-interestedly draw resources
from national commons, whereas executives, with a national constituency, will not).
184. For federal judges, who enjoy life tenure, politics is irrelevant to their pecuniary
interests, and the success of agency programs is relevant to the nonpecuniary rewards, such as
recognition for their craft, that motivate most judges’ decisions. For a discussion of judicial
motivations, see supra text accompanying notes 85–86.
Courts, however, can force themselves to take agency views into account by creating rules
of deference to agency views. See infra Part III.C., which takes up the question of the
appropriate rule of deference further.
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185

major rules. But other less well-known mandates in executive
orders include the requirement that agencies evaluate the impact of
186
their regulations on state, local, and tribal government. In fact,
Executive Order 12,866 explicitly invokes involvement of the public,
and State, Local, and Tribal officials in regulatory planning as one
187
purpose of its mandated Planning Mechanism.
Professor Mendelson asserts that agencies generally ignore the
mandate to consider impacts on state and local government, noting
188
that few agency analyses include federalism impact assessments.
This, however, is not surprising. The mandate is internal to the
executive branch, and presidents are unlikely to hold agencies to
comply with it when they are the force pushing for federal usurpation
of state and local government functions. In essence, Executive Orders
189
offer at most rather low-powered incentives for agency staff.
Courts, however, can create rather higher-powered incentives for
agency deliberation. For instance, under State Farm and other rules of
hard look review, a court can reject an agency decision outright, or
reciprocally (by relaxing the stringency of review) greatly lower the
190
effort an agency must invest in any given decision. Thus, to the
extent that agency deliberation about federalism may appear at first
to lag, courts can adjust doctrine to spur it.
Because agencies and courts each have their strengths when
considering federalism, the best institution for allocating power
between the federal government and the states depends on the
precise circumstances of the regulatory matter. If issues of abstract
federalism seem paramount, courts are the superior forum; if the
programmatic federalism issues predominate, agencies are the
preferable forum. We suspect that for most issues, agencies are the
better forum. Abstract federalism concerns are relatively insignificant

185. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 923–26.
186. See id. at 923–24.
187. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(9), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006).
188. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 783–86; Mendelson, supra note 4, at 718–19.
189. For a discussion of the president’s tools for agency oversight, see supra Part II.C.2.
190. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1411 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking,
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 67–68 (1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Ossification, supra note
116, at 514. On the rewards side, see Gersen, supra note 133, at 215; Metzger, supra note 62, at
2054–56.
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in the modern era, and courts can strengthen agency deliberation
through doctrines of review.
C. Political Accountability of Legislative, Judicial and Agency
Processes
Finally, opponents of agency control of federalism
determinations have sometimes maintained that Congress is more
191
accountable than agencies. Administrative law scholars are likely
already familiar with the various reasons to doubt this claim, but we
review the reasons herein, and apply them to this discussion.
In comparing accountability of the three institutions of
government, at first blush it appears that Congress enjoys a distinct
advantage because its members are directly elected, while agency and
judicial decisionmakers are not. But elections are fraught with
imperfections that potentially interfere even with basic accountability;
simultaneously, there are extrapolitical mechanisms that keep
administrative and even judicial decisionmaking from straying too far
from public sentiments. These complications demand careful analysis
192
of the relative accountability of Congress and agencies.
1. Legislative Accountability. Legislators are directly elected. If
they stray too far from the preferences of their constituents and
193
supporters, they will not likely be reelected. Because voters must
incur costs to discern the true position of candidates on policy issues,
however, the correlation between the positions of members of
194
Congress and their constituents is attenuated. Moreover, accepted
191. Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. PITT. L.
REV. 805, 832 (1998); Merrill, supra note 6, at 757; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note
4, at 331. But see Mendelson, supra note 29, at 741–42.
192. We think the debate about judicial accountability is familiar enough, and, in light of
Chevron’s acceptance of the superior accountability of agencies, settled enough, that we omit
further discussion of it.
193. See David W. Brady et al., Differences in Legislative Voting Behavior Between Winning
and Losing House Incumbents, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS 178, 181–
89 (David W. Brady et al. eds., 2000) (contending that representatives who take extreme
positions relative to their district’s preferences increase their probability of electoral defeat);
Robert S. Erkson & Gerald C. Wright, Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress, in
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS, supra, at 149, 177 (asserting that members of
Congress “lose votes—and sometimes elections—if they stray too far ideologically [from their
constituents]”).
194. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 102 n.270 (1991) (explaining that voters are likely to engage in
probabilistic voting—sometimes voting for alternatives contrary to their personal preferences—
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wisdom holds that incumbents in Congress enjoy a huge advantage
195
over challengers. The relative safety that incumbents seeking
reelection enjoy, all else being equal, illustrates the extent to which
assessments of the merits of the candidates’ positions on issues do not
drive many congressional elections.
Congressional inertia in adopting legislation also can drive a
wedge between current constituent preferences and legislative
outcomes. Even if the political market worked perfectly in all respects
except inertia, one could conclude only that statutes reflect public
196
preferences at the time they are passed. Circumstances change,
however, and with them the propriety of a particular regulatory
structure changes as well.
Congress has ways other than legislating to influence the power
of the federal government relative to the states—for example by
197
threatening to limit agency appropriations, which must be passed
every year for programs other than entitlement programs, or by
198
hauling an agency head into hearings. Because these mechanisms do
when information costs discourage voters from being fully informed about the alternatives).
Political parties and special interest groups provide information about candidates that help
voters reduce information costs, but do not provide a perfect proxy for knowledge of
candidates’ true position on policy issues. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 565 (2002) (discussing
interest group influence); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European
Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1700–01
(2002) (explaining that voters use parties as proxies for information on issues).
195. Incumbents have several advantages in overcoming voter information costs. They have
greater name recognition; garner more press coverage; and enjoy a monopoly in delivering rents
to interest groups, which yields contributions that fund communication with voters. See Ronald
A. Cass, Money, Power, and Politics: Governance Models and Campaign Finance Regulation, 6
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 46–47 (1998) (discussing the “incumbency advantage”); Linda
Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477, 479–80 (1992) (listing some of the
“tremendous advantages [that] incumbents enjoy over challengers”); Einer Elhauge, Are Term
Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 154–55 (1997) (discussing the advantages that
incumbents have over their challengers in contested elections). Especially for representatives
and less so for senators, the ability to garner votes by constituent service provides another
advantage to incumbents. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 61, 139 (2006) (describing how casework for constituents gives incumbents an electoral
advantage).
196. See Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 836
(1994) (commenting that legislative inertia is inherent in the political process and “severely
limits Congress’s ability to bring outdated statutes in line with the times”).
197. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE 100 (4th ed. 1998).
198. See Beermann, supra note 196, at 71–143 (surveying techniques, including committee
hearings, for congressional control over executive).
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not exhibit the same inertia as the substantive legislative process, one
might think that they provide alternatives by which Congress can
exert its will on federalism issues without having to authorize agencies
to address these issues. But except for appropriation riders, which
have the potential to cause members of Congress to incur political
199
costs, spending provisions and hearings do not limit or authorize
state regulatory authority or otherwise affect the reach of state law.
Rather, spending provisions work as carrots and sticks for agencies to
translate congressional will into regulatory reality. In other words, for
Congress pragmatically to maintain its influence over federalism, it
must grant agencies discretion over the reach of state regulatory
200
matters on programs that they administer.
2. Administrative Accountability. Although agencies are not
elected, they are subject to congressional and presidential oversight.
Some scholars contend that Congress can largely dictate important
201
agency decisions, whereas other scholars assert that the president
dictates the policies that agencies pursue and the regulations that they

199. Often appropriation riders “fly below the political radar,” and legislators may not even
be aware of riders in bills on which they vote. Beermann, supra note 195, at 88–89.
Commentators generally criticize riders for circumventing legislative accountability. See, e.g., id.
at 88 (summarizing why appropriation riders are problematic from the standpoint of the
legislative process); Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory
Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 643–44 (1996) (same). But their introduction can
usually be traced back to particular legislators who then can take heat for attempting to force
their colleagues to approve provisions that the entire body would not approve. See Carl Tobias,
Natural Resources and the White Commission Report, 79 OR. L. REV. 619, 629–30 (2000)
(reporting criticism by House leaders of an appropriation rider added by West Coast senators
that would have bifurcated the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
200. The extent to which Congress is willing to delegate depends on relative costs to its
members of creating policy themselves versus the agency cost that results from delegation. See
EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 133, at 49 (describing the cost-benefit analysis involved in
Congress’s decisionmaking process regarding the delegation of authority to agencies).
201. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 174, at 257 (“Administrative procedures,
however, can be used to guide agencies to make decisions that are broadly consistent with the
policy preferences of political principals.”); see also Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440–44 (1989) (describing mechanisms that
limit agencies’ ability to pursue policies different than those supported by politicians); Charles
Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50
ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 200 (1998) (suggesting that congressional oversight of agencies helps to
ensure that agencies’ actions are aligned with the wishes of congressional committees); Barry R.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking By the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 777–78 (1983)
(describing the congressional influence on Federal Trade Commission policy implementation).
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202

adopt. We do not believe that either congressional or presidential
influence on agencies is such that agencies have no significant
discretion even with respect to fundamental policy issues such as the
relationship between federal and state authority over regulatory
matters. We do, however, believe that both political branches of
government sufficiently constrain agencies that their decisions
generally do not deviate greatly from the postdeliberation
203
preferences of the polity. In contrast to courts or Congress, agency
decisions comport more closely with popular values because the
political branches can flexibly influence agency action and agencies
204
then can respond quickly to those influences.
As we have noted, Congress oversees agencies using a variety of
mechanisms from formal passage of substantive legislation to
informal threats of distracting and potentially embarrassing
205
committee hearings. The need for Congress to rely on “fire alarms”
to monitor agencies’ agendas provides a substantial advantage to
206
focused interest groups in the oversight process. Nonetheless, the
influence of interest groups on Congress does not fully translate into
equal influence on agencies because congressional influence favoring
interest groups is attenuated by Congress’s imperfect control over
207
agencies. In other words, slack in congressional control of agencies
reduces the impact of the kinds of antideliberative biases that would
affect congressional determinations of federalism issues.
Like Congress, the president also has an array of formal and
informal mechanisms for influencing agencies. Formally, the
president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints and
208
often can fire an agency head unilaterally. The president can greatly

202. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2281
(2001) (asserting that during the Clinton years “presidential control of administration . . .
[moved] to the center of the regulatory landscape”).
203. Seidenfeld, supra note 117, at 1554.
204. Mashaw, supra note 159, at 512–13.
205. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
206. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 144, at 172 (noting that fire-alarm oversight
“arguably emphasizes the interests of individuals and interest groups more than those of the
public at large”).
207. Because legislative control over agencies is probably greater when one party controls
both the White House and Congress, Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 63, 71–73 (2007), one-party rule increases the likelihood that
interest group influence over Congress will spill over to agencies.
208. This power is not unlimited. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 918 (“[F]iring an agency
head is politically costly to the president.”).
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influence the budget of agencies through the appropriations process
and can employ the power of the bully pulpit and the press to focus
209
on an agency and the popular support for agency programs. The
president thus can influence particular agency decisions and perhaps
even dictate outcomes for salient regulatory issues.
Although the precise effect of the president’s influence on an
agency decision depends on the preferences of the president
regarding that decision, the president is accountable to the electorate
in every state. In addition, a president up for reelection has to receive
votes from the electoral college, and state legislators are influential in
what is essentially a state-by-state presidential election as well as in
how the electoral votes for the state are allocated. Therefore, overall
one should expect that presidential influence would make agencies
more receptive to state concerns about their power over regulatory
210
matters.
3. Comparative Responsiveness to Contemporaneous Values of
the Polity. One distinct advantage of agencies over courts and
legislatures is that agencies are more responsive than either to current
political preferences. Because of legislative inertia, Congress passes
statutes infrequently. A court remaining true to the intent of the
adopting Congress may be implementing old public preferences if the
statute has not been revamped in years. Agencies, through both
congressional and presidential influences, are more apt to be
influenced by current political pressures because political influences
211
on agencies are ongoing and flexible.

209. See Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?:
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy
in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 124 (1996)
(reporting that many studies support the theory that the president plays “an agenda-setting role
for congressional deliberations on agency appropriations”); Terry M. Moe, Control and
Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094, 1101
(1985) (discussing the president’s influence over agencies, through the use of such mechanisms
as the appointment process and the agency budget).
210. It is not surprising that every president since Ronald Reagan has issued or at least
maintained an executive order requiring agencies specifically to consider state and local
government concerns when regulating. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (requiring that federal agencies avoid conflict with state laws
and keep preemption of state law to the “minimum level necessary”); Exec. Order No. 12,372,
47 Fed. Reg. 30,959 (July 14, 1982) (requiring that federal agencies consult with local and state
officials before proposing to limit state regulatory authority).
211. Metzger, supra note 62, at 2040–41; see also Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, supra note 4, at 2088 (suggesting that “administrators are in a far better position” to
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Whereas private litigants can be expected to keep courts aware
of live controversies, litigants by themselves can do little to update
the court about the preferences of the current polity. Over a long
enough period of time, the political nature of the judicial
appointment process ensures that the courts are not woefully out of
212
touch with popular sentiments. But because judicial appointments
happen infrequently and many judges sit for decades, one would
expect that judicial outcomes would sometimes lag the preferences of
213
the polity.
As with deliberativeness, courts have doctrinal options for
overcoming their own shortcomings. Most significantly, a court can
deal with change by incorporating into its own processes the dynamic
214
judgment of agencies. But this partnership can only arise if judicial
doctrine is open to agency consideration of the shifting field of
federalism.
III. FEDERALISM
In addition to the claim that Congress is institutionally superior
to agencies, the second major rationale underlying the preference for
congressional action is, as we have said, the claim that it represents a
sort of second-best enforcement mechanism for constitutional values
the Supreme Court is reluctant to defend directly. By demanding a
clear statement from both houses of Congress together with the
deal with changing circumstances than courts or the legislature); cf. Cuéllar, supra note 85, at
485 (claiming that empirical evidence supports the notion that the notice-and-comment process
changes regulatory outcomes).
212. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 51 (2003) (opining that lack of public
support doomed the Lochner era jurisprudence but its demise still required a change in the
Justices on the Supreme Court); Neal Devins, How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate
the Myth of Judicial Supremacy, 3 GREEN BAG 259 (2000) (stating that “populist resistance to
Court decisionmaking often prompts the Court to recalibrate its position”).
213. The Lochner era is probably the most notorious example of judicial policy falling
behind popular preferences. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense
of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 990 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
(2004)) (stating that during the Lochner era, the Court “was notorious for thumbing its nose at
the will of the people”).
214. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2700 (2005) (allowing an agency to overrule a lower federal court’s interpretation of a statute in
certain circumstances to allow courts to consider the agency position on that interpretation);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (creating
doctrine under which courts are to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes).
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consent of the president (or a supermajoritarian agreement of the two
houses alone) before federal power can displace state power, the
Court increases the systemic resistance to expanded federal
215
influence.
As a descriptive matter, this account seems hard to dispute. We
could not seriously contend that it is more difficult to enact
regulations than to enact clear legislation.
Our method in this Part accordingly is a bit different from our
approach in the last. Although we accept the factual premise behind
the preference for Congress, we question its uniform application.
Why should all expansions of federal power be equally difficult to
implement? In some cases, we argue, federal agency action is
consistent with, rather than at odds with, federalism values—for
example, where the agency is a better arena for state influence than
Congress alone. Moreover, the normative justification behind
sheltering the states may be stronger or weaker in varying
circumstances. A realist view of federalism should account for these
differences, rather than imposing a single, blanket presumption.
A. The Case for Nuanced Evaluation of Federalism Effects
Federalism is not a constitutional monolith, but instead a
composite of somewhat related values, some of which at times rest
uneasily together. In preserving local autonomy against a single,
national rule, federalism offers citizens with differing preferences the
opportunity to craft a local rule that most nearly accords with their
216
values. Local choices may prove impossible or counterproductive,
215. See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 709–11 (discussing “justifications for the presumption
against preemption of state law”); Mendelson, supra note 29, at 753 (“[C]ourts effectively make
congressional deliberation a prerequisite to preemption.”); see also McGinnis, supra note 55, at
902–03 (describing the relative ease of administrative enactments).
216. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1991) (describing federalism and the
importance of preserving the powers of state governments); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498–99 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)) (discussing why local governments
are more likely to pursue various policies that are popular with the electorate than is the
national government); Oates, supra note 31, at 1122–23 (proposing that one rationale for a
decentralized provision of goods and services is that local governments “possess knowledge of
both local preferences and cost conditions”). Although we accept this efficiency-related value of
federalism for the sake of argument, we note that one could reach the same goal using a
centralized system that permitted but guided local experiments. Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note
31, at 919–20 (“If we are truly serious about providing people with the exit option of choice, or
the voice option of participation, we should provide those options universally, through a
national, decentralized program.”).
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however, when the results of a decision in one jurisdiction spill over
217
Similarly, although decentralization permits
to affect others.
efficiency-enhancing competition, it may also result in higher political
rents and compliance and lobbying costs, as well as a sacrifice of some
218
potential economies of scale. Variety permits experimentation, but
when new ideas result in positive externalities to other jurisdictions,
219
innovation is likely to be produced at a socially suboptimal level.
Finally, local governments may be a political counterweight to the
national government, so that even if they are fruitless on their own
they nonetheless help to preserve liberty or good government in the
220
nation as a whole; the existence of multiple layers of government,

217. Oates, supra note 31, at 1121. Additionally, the existence of beneficial spillovers
suggests that local governments would produce public goods at a level below the social optimum
because the benefits of the good are not realized by the provider. Id.; see also Tom Stacy & Kim
Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 289–90 (1997)
(noting that states underenforce criminal laws because they fail to consider the benefits such
enforcement provides to other states).
218. Rents, lobbying, and compliance costs can increase simply because, under a federal
system, regulated entities have to monitor and lobby numerous local governments and comply
with numerous standards that may be inconsistent with one another. See Jonathan R. Macey,
Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271–73 (1990) (offering high
transaction costs as grounds for why interest groups prefer regulation at the national level);
Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV.
895, 919–21, 925–26 (1992) (describing costs of diversity in local taxing systems). But see Barry
R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and
Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 5 (1995) (contending that federalism usually
induces competition among jurisdictions that might drive down monopoly rents demanded by
local governments). Weingast’s prediction seems to us difficult to reconcile with the observed
behavior of multijurisdictional businesses, which appear to prefer uniform rules to multifaceted
competition. See, e.g., John A. Swain & Walter Hellerstein, The Political Economy of the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 605, 613 (2005) (describing efforts
of nationwide retailers to force states to harmonize their sales tax regimes).
219. For well-articulated statements of the proposition that jurisdictional variety leads to
fruitful, competitive experimentation, see PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 18–
19 (1995); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 208–09
(1997). A number of critics argue that externalities will result in suboptimal experimentation if
the government is committed to subnational actors. E.g., David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as
a Networked Order: The International System as an Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 60 (2005); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection:
Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980); Rubin & Feeley,
supra note 31, at 925; Koleman Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy
Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 208 (2002).
220. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1, 21 (2006) (“[A] principal end of federalism is the protection of the liberties of the people,
both personal and political.”).
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however, may make the whole more opaque, reducing the
221
responsiveness of elected officials both locally and nationally.
A key implication of these cross-cutting currents is that some
apparent expansions of national power may actually better protect
federalism values than the status quo. Spillovers are the readiest
222
source of examples. Lax regulations in one state—be they on
handguns, fireworks, or abortions—can make restrictions in nearby
223
states largely fruitless. Upwind pollution makes East Coast clean-air
224
efforts prohibitively expensive, for example, and tax havens siphon
funds away from states with preferences for more government
225
services. Federal regulation can adjust state autonomy to a level at
which it is more nearly Kantian—that is, more consistent with the
226
greatest freedom for all. Alternatively, the federal government
might take the lead in policy setting in an area in which there is a
need for experiment so that the decisionmakers would internalize the
227
nationwide benefits of the information that would result. There are
similar stories we could tell for each of federalism’s many tradeoffs.
221. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F.
Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.
71, 110.
222. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 405–09 (1997)
(discussing economic rationales for federal control, including addressing externalities); Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1371–72
(2006) (explaining that interstate externalities can be solved either by interstate compacts or
uniform national standards).
223. See Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault
Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 516 (1992) (concluding that crimes committed with
guns bought outside of a local jurisdiction make it difficult to assess the direct impact of local
gun control laws); Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the
Great American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 700 (2004) (noting the position of the
National Council to Control Handguns that local laws are ineffective).
224. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2341, 2349–54 (1996) (recognizing externalities as a justification for federal
environmental regulation, but arguing that the federal government has used its authority
inefficiently); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215–16 (1977)
(arguing that negative externalities of pollution justifies federal environmental regulation).
225. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1586–99 (2000) (describing how tax havens prevent
other nations from setting optimal tax levels); Robin Boadway et al., The Consequences of
Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and Public Spending in a Federation, 68 J. PUB. ECON.
453, 453–54 (1998) (discussing spillover effects resulting from individual states’ tax policies).
226. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35 (John Ladd trans.,
1965) (1797).
227. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 321–22 (1998) (offering an elaborate set of tools for
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The likelihood that state autonomy sometimes undermines
federalism in turn suggests that any rule throwing up broad barriers
around that autonomy is probably ill advised. To be sure, it is possible
that, notwithstanding the exceptions we identify, a general
presumption against federal encroachments benefits the nation on
net. But the overall benefits of the resulting rule could be further
improved by raising the costs, not of all national regulation, but
rather of only that federal regulation inconsistent with the best
interests of the public. The only case in which that might not be true
would be if the costs of adding nuance to the rule outweigh the
benefits of greater precision. We return to that question shortly.
First, though, to make our point as plainly as possible: on the
assumption that resistance to national norms should be increased only
when those norms disserve beneficial federalism, a clear statement of
federal authority from an agency should often be as or more
authoritative in a court’s eyes as a clear statement from Congress to
228
the same effect. Although Congress has its strengths, such as its
ability to consider more abstract federalism questions, agencies
frequently are in a better position to assess the programmatic costs
229
and benefits of federalism, as we have demonstrated in Part II.C.
Their greater accuracy in this assessment in most instances will
swamp the likely effects of underprotection of abstract federalism
values. Again, the premise of the preference for congressional action
is that it serves federalism values by increasing the cost and
decreasing the volume of rules that reduce state autonomy. It would
be counterproductive to increase the cost or reduce the volume of
agency decisions that actually serve the proper goals of federalism.

incentivizing information sharing and innovation by local governments); Rose-Ackerman, supra
note 219, at 615–16 (suggesting that the central government could offer grants or prizes to spur
localities to innovate, but might be better off just contracting directly with private firms or
having federal agencies create innovative policy).
228. In this respect we agree with Professor Merrill that the extent to which a regulation
displaces state law might vary depending on the subject of the regulation, although we would
also consider an array of other factors. Merrill, supra note 6, at 738–44; see also Dinh, supra note
43, at 2098–99 (arguing that presumption against preemption applies only “where concern for
state regulation properly plays a role”). But see Hills, supra note 28, at 6–8 (noting that
Professor Merrill’s approach has some virtues but ultimately rejecting it as too difficult for
courts to apply). As we explain in the next paragraph of the main text, Professor Hills’s criticism
of the more nuanced approach is weaker against our version of judicial decisionmaking, because
in our vision agency participation strengthens judicial capacity to find facts, analyze institutions,
and adapt as those facts and institutions change.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 119–44.
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It might be argued in response that, taking into account decision
and error costs, a bright-line rule requiring legislative action is still
superior to one with exceptions for “good” regulations. For example,
suppose that courts have limited resources, and that determining
whether a given regulation is good for federalism values consumes a
230
great deal of time and judicial effort. Improving the performance of
the federalism-enhancing rule at the margins might then result in
fewer resources for other court projects, including efforts to enforce
federalism more directly. Even if federalism were the only value in
play, a more nuanced rule might reduce the overall achievement of
federalism’s ends. Further, a critic might contend that even in the
event that courts’ resources are not especially limited, the court is
more likely to sometimes reach the wrong results—allowing the
federal government to expand too easily—because the nuanced rule
231
is more difficult to apply.
Although these are empirical questions, one can get some sense
of the size of the expected costs by considering the likely performance
of agencies. As we have argued, agencies are highly skilled at most of
the tasks that comprise a decision about federalism, and they often
232
have incentives to exercise those skills on behalf of states. To the
extent that agencies are relatively disinclined to examine closely the
federalism implications of their decisions, courts can offer them
additional incentives to do so through rules of review and deference
233
that increase or decrease the agency’s cost and reward structure.
Granting a higher degree of deference for thoroughly reasoned
agency-federalism decisions therefore serves two dovetailing ends for
the court: it reduces the court’s cost of conducting its own
independent research and analysis while increasing the likelihood that
234
the agency decision is right.

230. For a discussion of these forms of judicial calculations in dealing with judiciallymanageable standards, see Fallon, supra note 52, at 1310–13.
231. Some have argued against “atom-splitting” analysis of these questions. See, e.g., Hills,
supra note 28, at 56 (defending the presumption against preemption on the ground that it
conserves judicial resources); Merrill, supra note 6, at 773–74; Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning
with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the United States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland
Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 24 (2006) (arguing that an uncertain federalism
doctrine limits state autonomy).
232. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
233. See supra notes 175–80 and accompanying text.
234. This is not to say that we endorse Chevron deference to agency federalism decisions.
Our view is that the most sensible deference approach is a sliding scale. See infra Part III.C.
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Moreover, the court’s own performance is likely to be weaker
without the benefit of agency consideration. From time to time
Congress will overcome the resistance norm and enact clear
legislation. On those occasions the courts may have to outright decide
the question of the appropriate scope of national authority. They will
be far better positioned to do so if they can draw on the extensive
analysis and research of an agency that has already considered the
question, experimented with alternative outcomes, and updated its
235
results as the world changes.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
performance in balancing on its own the competing interests that
federalism entails have been so uninspiring that both commentators
and Justices themselves have often called for it to give up the
236
project.
Although Congress too can deliberate, courts should prefer to
encounter federalism questions in the context of agency, rather than
congressional, enactments. As we have argued, there is little
mechanism in the legislative branch for ongoing reevaluation of a
policy, and the very high costs of legislative change decrease the
237
likelihood that Congress will respond definitively to new events.
True deliberation may be rare in an institution that strikes internal
bargains to overcome its own inertia. And courts would have more
influence over agency deliberation, helping ensure that agencies took
great care before displacing state law so that the expected outcome
would be less likely to displace state law when that would be bad
policy.
On the other hand, there may be some policy decisions in which
Congress, because of its structure, provides unique information for
the courts to appraise. This is arguably more likely to be the case
238
when abstract federalism concerns loom larger than economic ones.
Thus, for example, it could make sense for the courts to look for clear
235. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 164–80 (1997); see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 227, at 363 (stating that
in a regime led by agency experimentation, “courts [would] decide administrative law cases
against a detailed backdrop of fact”).
236. Hills, supra note 28, at 6.
237. We acknowledge that the superior adaptability of agencies depends to some extent on
the rules for judicial review of agency decisions, some of which have the potential to “ossify” the
regulatory process. For a discussion of the optimal set of rules of judicial review, see infra Part
III.C.
238. Again, by “abstract” federalism we mean rights-preserving federalism, in which divided
government reduces the likelihood of tyranny. Professor Galle would like to note here that he
finds this argument considerably less persuasive than does Seidenfeld.
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congressional authorization of agency action before crediting a
determination of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms on
states’ rights to regulate guns, notwithstanding the Second
239
Amendment. In those instances, a congressional clear statement
rule might be more defensible because without the information
Congress provides, the court could be unable to determine whether
240
the policy serves or disserves abstract federalism values.
Congress may also be epistemically superior to agencies when
there is some question whether a policy is on net nationwide welfare
241
enhancing. For instance, imagine that widgets can be manufactured
to be either red or green. There are some economies of scale in
production and distribution if all widgets nationwide are the same
color, which would generate a modest amount of consumer and
producer surplus. Federalism—in this case, the instrumental goal of
federalism to enhance nationwide welfare through diversification of
local choices—would thus be served by maintaining a local choice of
widget color if, but only if, welfare losses for those consumers who
would prefer to purchase widgets in the alternative color would
exceed the size of this surplus.

239. That is, because the Second Amendment is sometimes said to be a structural device for
resisting government encroachments, abstract federalism concerns would likely loom larger in
that context.
240. On the other hand, as we have noted, we think the significance of abstract federalism is
minimal in the modern world, where there seems no serious danger that the states will disappear
as rival sources of political authority to the federal government.
241. To our mind this is the main significance of the suggestion, which we think implicit in
Sunstein’s work, that the congressional clear statement rule is appealing because Congress is
more “democratic” than are agencies. Although Sunstein does not outright assert this argument,
he notes that the superior democratic pedigree of legislatures is one of the points usually offered
in favor of nondelegation. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 319–20. He then
suggests that the nondelegation arguments he canvasses are more persuasive in the instance of
constitutional avoidance. Id. at 321; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s
Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2610 (2006) (stating that the avoidance
canon “grants the executive exactly the degree of discretion that it deserves to possess”). This
seems a tentative endorsement of the democracy argument.
As a general proposition, we think the argument for representativeness per se is
incoherent. We agree with Professor Edward Rubin that there is no persuasive account of
representation that specifies the proper degree of representativeness of government. See
Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713–15 (2001) (proposing
that a government should be analyzed in terms of its interactions with its citizens, as opposed to
generalized notions of democracy). Democracy’s value must lie either in its power to enable
individual participation in government or in its epistemic qualities—that is, its ability to reach
better results because of the quality of deliberation it entails. Thus, we take Sunstein’s point to
be a claim that Congress, because of the way in which it provides for representation, can better
be relied on to produce welfare-enhancing outcomes.
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One might argue that Congress is better designed to produce
242
information about these kinds of net welfare determinations. If
agency costs are small, majority voting by representatives elected
regionally, combined with logrolling, should permit those groups
whose disutility would exceed any national gain from uniformity to
243
kill the legislation. If the bill passes, therefore, it is relatively easy
for a court to conclude that it is welfare increasing for the nation as a
whole. The agency’s decision to regulate does not signal welfare
maximization as strongly. True, the president heads the executive
244
branch and is elected nationally. Still, even if agency costs are quite
low, and the president truly represents every state (rather than, say,
“swing” states), it remains possible that the president’s position more
nearly represents the median national voter than the total national
245
welfare. The executive has no built-in internal logrolling mechanism
for trading off stronger for weaker preferences. Thus, the agency
decision to regulate may or may not increase welfare. An agency
might have to rely on relatively complex and controversial tools, such
as contingent valuation surveys, to assure the court that its decision
246
was as good as the legislature’s.

242. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 942–43 (conceding that because the executive is more
“centralized,” it may be less skilled at correctly estimating the costs and benefits of regulation).
243. In other words, if a bill would cost 25 percent of the nation 100 utils per person but gain
the other three-quarters 5 utils, the bill will fail because representatives of the disfavored
quarter will be able to trade their votes on less important matters to defeat the proposed bill.
244. Calabresi, supra note 184, at 35 (arguing that a national election of the president
renders the president more likely to maximize national welfare); Kagan, supra note 202, at 2335
(same).
245. That is, the president might maximize votes rather than derive a policy based on the
intensity of voter preferences. Thus, it is possible that the president would favor a policy that
was weakly favorable for 51 percent of the nation and strongly unfavorable to the other 49
percent. Political science suggests that this outcome is unlikely, but it does so only by relaxing
the assumption that there are little or no agency costs. E.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 11–12 (1971) (explaining that policy
outcomes depend on expression of preferences, not simply votes). On the question whether the
president may target swing voters in swing states rather than the welfare of the whole nation,
see Nzelibe, supra note 139, at 1235–39.
246. A fine overview of the challenges of demonstrating that a regulatory policy is optimal
in some sense, such as overall well being, can be found in Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 172–87, 225–43 (1999). For examples of
discussion on the use of citizen surveys in making these determinations, see William H.
Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of
Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91, 91–93, 113–
114 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent
Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 47–48 (1994).
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This argument, however, fails under a straightforward
247
application of public choice theory. For instance, when there are
agency costs, the opacity of the logrolling process may facilitate
248
welfare-diminishing bargains. There is no scholarly consensus
whether Congress is more or less subject to interest group pressures
than the Executive; we tend to side with those who say “more,” but
249
we recognize that the debate is still open. In any event, in order to
justify a demand for a clear statement from Congress under this
rationale, one would have to believe that Congress’s failure to act
sends a meaningful signal about national welfare. Thanks to the high
costs of any definitive congressional action, though, relying on
congressional inaction as a signal of anything meaningful is dubious—
250
a familiar point to students of the dormant commerce clause.
In sum, there is little reason to believe that a bright-line rule
prohibiting executive expansions of federal power serves beneficial
federalism better than a more nuanced one. Without agency
assistance, courts are more likely to draw the borders of state
autonomy wrongly, and the court can design rules for reviewing
agency deliberations that both increase accuracy and reduce judicial
effort. We would add further that even if the considerations were in
equipoise, false negatives (wrongly rejecting some good policies as
bad for state autonomy) are just as bad as false positives (wrongly

247. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 772 (“[T]he President may be better able than
Congress to register the full intensity of the public’s preferences.”).
248. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
249. Compare MASHAW, supra note 235, at 152 (“The President has no particular
constituency to which he or she has special responsibility to deliver benefits. Presidents are
hardly cut off from pork-barrel politics. Yet issues of national scope and the candidates’
positions on those issues are the essence of presidential politics.”), and MANCUR OLSON, THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL
RIGIDITIES 50–52 (1982) (“[I]ndividual members of Congress are overwhelmingly influenced by
the parochial interests of their particular districts and by special-interest lobbies.”), and Frank
H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1341 (1994) (“A President may resist claims by factions . . . by adding
other items to the agenda.”), and Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas
of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193–96
(1994) (discussing the comparative advantage resulting from the president’s national
constituency), with Nzelibe, supra note 139, at 1249 (acknowledging “that individual legislators
may be primarily concerned with their constituents” but concluding that Congress has “a
comparative advantage over the president in understanding the potential costs and tradeoffs
involved in any specific legislation”).
250. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 588–90; see also Hills, supra note 28,
at 12 (describing causes of congressional gridlock).
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permitting some policies that are bad for state autonomy). As we
have shown, many false negatives would themselves undermine
federalism values. Therefore, even if one wanted to choose the
position that was most likely to minimize federalism-damaging errors,
it is quite possible that ours is that position.
B. Formalism Strikes Back: Must the Judiciary Have Exclusive
Control Over Deliberations About Federalism?
The story we have given so far depends on a willingness to
acknowledge that the legal realism that animates administrative law
also should inform constitutional doctrine. If constitutional outcomes
turn on complex questions of fact and political judgment, it is sensible
that agencies should play at least some role in their resolution.
Indeed, our argument depends on the stricture that, before agencies
can approach constitutional boundaries between state and federal
governments, they must first deliberate about the wisdom of their
choice to do so. This logic has one significant sticking point. At the
time of this writing, the Supreme Court seems somewhat hostile to
constitutional legal realism, and clings instead to a more formalist
claim that in constitutional matters it must remain solely for the Court
252
to say what the law is. In this Section we briefly consider whether
formalism has any appeal. In fact, we concede that it has its place, but
we argue that the most sensible application of the principles that
would justify it suggests that formalism should only rarely bar an
253
agency from deliberating about and affecting state authority.
To begin with the points in favor of limiting agency authority to
consider the Constitution, claims that constitutional reasoning is
different from other legal interpretation and that it is uniquely the
realm of judges may serve to reinforce the uniqueness of the judicial
role. This in turn offers two somewhat distinct advantages for the
251. For an argument that the presumption is an effort to avoid erroneous preemptions, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1024–25 (1989).
252. United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 880–82 (2006); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519–20, 529, 532 (1997) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)); see also Galle, supra note 86, at 165 (describing the Court’s claims to exclusive power to
interpret the Constitution).
253. Others have taken a stronger stand in favor of constitutional deliberation in the
executive branch. E.g., Kelley, supra note 59, at 886–91; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore,
The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1269–70 (1996);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 264 (1994).
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judiciary. For one, as others have noted, it may be a way of deflecting
254
If
popular discontent over countermajoritarian outcomes.
constitutional law is “law” whereas all else is simply part of “politics,”
then judges can assert that their constitutional rulings are not the
product of their own preferences but instead the result of following
the law wherever it leads. Reserving this law-giving power to judges
might signal to the populace that the judiciary is uniquely qualified
for that role, so that its views are legitimate and ought to be accepted.
Relatedly, the signal of judicial uniqueness may help to shape the
internal psychological norms of judging, so that in fact judges do
255
behave differently than other political actors.
Neither of these points persuades us that agencies should be
prohibited from or presumed incompetent at reasoning about
federalism. Exclusivity—barring Congress and agencies from relying
on their own constitutional reasoning—cannot be an effective means
of reducing political resistance to the judicial project, because a court
256
acting alone is necessarily not minimalist but maximalist. Not only
must it achieve all its goals with no assistance from the political
branches—and thus with no partner to guide it to better outcomes or
to share political heat—but it must also act often to defend its
supposedly unique prerogatives. The claim that there is something
distinctive about constitutional law is difficult to maintain against the
fact that many decisions with constitutional overtones, such as the
257
rules for access to the courthouse, are often politically crafted.
Although the courts could take over all such decisions (including their
own budgets, presumably), that too is the path of maximalism.
On the other hand, both aspects of judicial uniqueness can
arguably be made cogent in limited circumstances. If the key to
reinforcing the judiciary’s own professional norms is a claim to
eliteness, judges could achieve that by staking a claim even to a small
slice of constitutional law, such as particularly fundamental or central
rules. And when constitutional rights are in conflict, the Supreme
Court may want to limit competing interpretations that could inspire
greater political resistance to its resolution (although this would come
254. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 237 (2004); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political
Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 93–94 (1998).
255. Galle, supra note 252, at 202–09.
256. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 796 (2002).
257. See Galle, supra note 252, at 199.
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at the cost of losing potential insights about alternative solutions).
Even if applied selectively, the claim of uniqueness could buttress a
court that says its balancing on some particularly fundamental issues
258
has special moral status.
The other potential justification for a formalist approach
similarly has strong appeal only when applied narrowly. Some
proponents of the formalist approach have contended that exclusive
judicial control over the Constitution allows the Court to settle
259
controversial social issues. That explanation seems strained as to the
more practical, nuts-and-bolts aspects of constitutional law, or as to
those, such as federalism, in which the underlying issues are based on
260
fluid facts rather than enduring value debates. Moreover, given the
possibility that cooperative interpretation produces better results,
settlement seems foolish; it encourages courts to lock in inferior
261
solutions. Still, there might be occasions in which an attractive
answer seems evident and settlement would indeed be appealing.
Therefore, we again see that the strongest arguments against
agency determinations of federal power have force only occasionally.
A formalist view of constitutional deliberation cannot explain, for
example, a blanket presumption against preemption, or an allencompassing avoidance doctrine. At most, the formalist could at
times rule out the sort of agency deliberation we invoke here. In the
next Section, we sketch when those kinds of formalist complaints,
combined with other considerations, could most forcefully limit
agency action.
C. Deference and Other Details
Having proposed a more complex balancing test in place of a
bright-line rule, we should explain how we expect our test to operate.
We envision the central question as “should this agency action be

258. For more extensive discussion of the tradeoffs inherent in partial claims of judicial
exclusivity, see Galle, supra note 252, at 209–16.
259. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360–62, 1371–81 (1997); see also Merrill, supra note 6, at 757–58
(arguing that a strong stare decisis rule for preemption would permit private actors to invest
efficiently).
260. See Whittington, supra note 256, at 791 (arguing that exclusivity undermines the
possibility that doctrine can adapt to change).
261. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 467, 514–15 (2000).
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262

permitted to displace state authority?” To our minds, the main
factors at play should be the strength of the underlying interest in
state autonomy, the agency’s decision process, the court’s need for
information from the agency, the evidence of congressional
authorization, the need for exclusive judicial control over
fundamental constitutional issues, and the possibility of political
externalities.
The most fundamental factor for the court to consider would be
the degree to which the underlying federalism norm needs shelter. As
we have explained, not all encroachments on state power contravene
the interests of federalism. In other situations, an agency decision
taken in isolation might diminish state prerogatives, but a host of
other surrounding factors bolster them. For instance, one small,
detailed change to state tort law, in the context of a tort system that
states overwhelmingly control, deserves less scrutiny than a
preemption on the scale of the Employment Retirement Income
263
Security Act. Alternatively, it may be that a preemption or other
state-displacing system provides other channels for state influence,
such as the State Implementation Plan process common in
264
environmental legislation. If the court is largely convinced that
federal authority is consistent with federalism or makes only a small
dent in it, then the “resistance” the court should provide ought to
diminish accordingly.
The process behind the federal decision is nearly as important as
its substance. A thorough, deliberative decision, in which state and
private stakeholders have a place at the table and a meaningful voice
in outcomes, should command substantial respect. Again, we have
explained why that is so: it both increases the likelihood that the
outcome is a reasonable balancing and also influences future
administrative actions further toward that end.
262. As we have suggested, there are a number of different situations that would present
this question, including agency interpretation of a statute in a manner that raises an issue about
Congress’s power to involve the federal government in matters traditionally regulated by states,
e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000), as well as agency regulations that
explicitly displace state regulations through preemption.
263. E.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208–09 (2006) (discussing the
“expansive” preemptive effect of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act). We note
that we do not think of a complete prohibition on private tort suits as a “small, detailed”
change; we have in mind here something like statutes of limitations or rules for the admissibility
of evidence.
264. See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 470 (2004) (describing
the State Implementation Plan process and the state role in it).
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A troublesome issue on this front is the state of administrative
law deference doctrine. On the understanding prevailing in some
influential places, such as the D.C. Circuit, courts and agencies have a
265
distasteful set of choices. One option is Chevron deference, which is
typically costlier in procedure for the agency, but which offers the
agency extensive control over the legal outcome and the opportunity
to change its finding over time in response to new developments or
266
267
leadership. Alternatively, under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and its
progeny, the agency can opt for procedurally simpler enactment but
268
surrenders interpretive primacy to courts. The resulting holding is
frozen as the definitive meaning of the statute until Congress revisits
it or the agency expends the effort to enact regulations deserving of
269
Chevron deference.
We doubt Chevron is flexible enough to capture all the nuances
270
of our test. Perhaps the balancing we describe here could be

265. See Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 40–42 (2007);
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1059 (noting that the D.C. Circuit has affirmed agency
decisions at a far lower rate than other circuits).
266. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative
Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1318–20 (2002); Schuck & Elliot, supra note 265, at 1047
(finding that agencies frequently change their interpretations of statutes that have been
judicially affirmed under Chevron review).
267. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
268. Chevron and Skidmore deference represent differing methods for coordinating
statutory meaning between two different interpreters, courts and agencies. Under a regime of
Chevron deference, a court treats any reasonable agency interpretation of an uncertain
statutory provision as the correct interpretation. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). In contrast, Skidmore deference is a matter of judicial
prudence, under which an agency interpretation has at most the “power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Although the Supreme Court has left open some
question as to when each mode is triggered, in general, agency determinations that issue after
relatively formal notice-and-comment procedures receive binding, Chevron deference, whereas
those that are issued informally by low-level agency officials receive only Skidmore regard. For
further discussion of all these points, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838–63 (2001).
269. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700
(2005) (holding that an agency can alter lower court interpretations of ambiguous statutes by
proceeding in a manner that triggers Chevron deference).
270. A court’s review of an agency interpretation under Chevron deference comprises two
steps. First, the court determines whether Congress has clearly indicated its intended outcome.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. If so, that outcome prevails, regardless of the agency’s views. Id. If
Congress has not clearly resolved the issue at hand, however, then at Step Two, the court asks
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
227 (2001). If so, it is controlling. Id. Agencies can alter their views of what is the most
reasonable view of an ambiguous statute and still command Chevron deference from courts.

01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC

2008]

11/14/2008 9:28:04 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S FEDERALISM

1999

shoehorned into a kind of Step One question inquiry—does the
statute, in light of the background norms and other factors we
271
describe, clearly prohibit expanded federal authority? But because
an agency cannot alter Step One interpretations, any judicial holding
that the statute does not grant authority to an agency would, through
272
stare decisis, lock the court into its position. Yet one of the key
advantages of involving agencies in the federalism decision is their
ability to help update the accuracy of a legal decision over time. And
even a holding that the agency did have authority would leave the
court without future flexibility to incentivize agency deliberation
about federalism concerns.
Similarly, it is uncertain whether a rule that determines when the
Chevron framework applies to an agency interpretation—the socalled “Step Zero” question—can be changed absent intervening
273
274
congressional action. On our reading of Barnhart v. Walton, Step
Zero holdings could be changed by courts in response to new
275
information alone. In our view, that decision makes the deference
determination turn on what look to be fluctuating factors, such as the
276
thoroughness and quality of agency deliberation. But there are
277
those who disagree with our view on that point.
Finally, we think placing our test at Step Two would likely water
it down hopelessly. Step Two is intended to be highly deferential to
Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2701. A court’s determination of Congress’s intent at Step One, however,
is a definitive reading of the statute that the agency is not free to alter. Id.
271. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 745–46 (discussing this possibility).
272. The Court is reluctant to revisit its own interpretations of statutes. Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007) (“[C]oncerns about maintaining
settled law are strong when the question is one of statutory interpretation.”).
273. See Gersen, supra note 133, at 207, 217, 226, 235, 243. For the origin of the term and its
explication, see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 268, at 912–13; Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 passim (2006).
274. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
275. See id. at 222 (holding that the question of whether or not to grant an agency
interpretation Chevron deference turns on “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the
related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the
question over a long period of time”).
276. See Gersen, supra note 133, at 218–19. Others offer this view of Mead as well. E.g., Lisa
Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1443, 1457 (2005).
277. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (tying Chevron deference
to congressional intent about whether the means an agency chose to make an interpretation has
the “force of law”); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 268, at 882 (advocating a formal
rather than fact driven test for when agency has power to issue binding regulations).
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agencies, and we doubt courts would be willing under that rubric to
impose fairly rigorous restraints on regulations that seriously distort
278
federalism norms.
If Chevron is too inflexible, then granting only Skidmore
deference to agencies’ federalism-tinged decisions would be inflexible
279
in spades. That is, because National Cable & Telecommunications
280
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services (Brand X) seems to make
entitlement to Chevron deference a precondition for an agency’s
281
power to overturn a prior judicial interpretation, a regime in which
agencies can earn only Skidmore deference would mean that once a
court interprets a statute, the agency cannot change that
interpretation. That inflexibility defeats nearly all of the objectives of
our test. In addition to sacrificing adaptability and ongoing ties to a
more democratic decisionmaker, inflexibility also diminishes the
rewards to the agency for following the court’s proscribed

278. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 1253, 1261 & n.35 (1997) (noting that in the first thirteen years applying
Chevron, the Supreme Court never struck down an agency interpretation at Step Two, but also
reporting D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals cases that applied something akin to hard look review
at Step Two); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (1994) (“[O]nce [a court]
reaches step two, it rarely reverses an agency interpretation as unreasonable.”). By our count,
which is admittedly not comprehensive, after twenty-four years of living with Chevron, the
Supreme Court has reversed an agency at Step Two only once, in that case because the agency
interpretation fell outside the bounds of the ambiguity in the statute. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–89 (1999) (holding that the requirements that network elements be
necessary for them to be subject to open access requirements under the 1996
Telecommunications Act could not support a rule opening access to all network elements).
279. Mead, 533 U.S. at 249–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Some commentators have suggested
that Skidmore is the more malleable of the two deference doctrines, in that it offers courts more
factors to consider in deciding whether or not to defer to an agency than the putatively wooden
Chevron Step One analysis. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal
Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 509 n.198 (1996) (suggesting that Skidmore is malleable enough
to support strong Chevron-type deference in appropriate situations); Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 268, at 913 (noting the pragmatic nature of the Skidmore inquiry). If, however, one takes
seriously the Court’s opinion in Barnhart, then Chevron deference too can depend on a sliding
scale of factors.
For advocates of Skidmore deference in the context of agency efforts to preempt state
law, see Mendelson, supra note 29, at 797 (suggesting Skidmore deference for federalism issues
of interpretation); Sharkey, supra note 21, 491–98 (suggesting Skidmore deference at least to
agency determination of facts and policy considerations that would support or undermine
preemption).
280. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
281. See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2701.
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procedures. Skidmore also fails on the incentives front by making
the rewards to the agency for good and open deliberation too
uncertain. Considering the costs of the form of decisionmaking we
recommend, the rewards to the agency must be correspondingly
large. Accordingly, courts must have flexibility to commit to a level of
deference that, if short of what Chevron offers, is nonetheless more
than the empty tautology into which some courts have made
283
Skidmore.
To us, then, the solution is that the appropriate level of
deference is something of an amalgam of Skidmore and hard look
284
review. Under this modification, the courts should look not only at
the institutional factors that justify deference to the agency but also at
the procedural posture in which the decision was made and at the
agency reasoning explicitly explaining its determination on federalism
values. Courts could grant something close to binding deference to
well-crafted federalism decisions. Moreover, as with Chevron, agency
determinations to which a court defers should probably be
285
provisional—that is, subject to change by the agency itself.
282. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 28–29, 93 (1997); Gersen, supra note 133, at 215 (noting that deference is a form of
positive incentive courts can offer to agencies).
283. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1252–53 (2007) (describing one judicial interpretation of
Skidmore that “in effect . . . directs courts to treat the agency’s view just as it would the view of
any litigant”).
284. At bottom, then, our approach may at times be similar to Professor Merrill’s and
Professor Young’s. Merrill suggests that although agencies ought not have any power to
preempt absent clear congressional authorization, when such authorization has been given,
courts should grant a Skidmore-like sliding scale of deference to the agency’s views, depending
on agency expertise and the quality of its deliberations. Merrill, supra note 6, at 775. Our main
qualm with that approach is that we would grant deference regardless of what Congress had
expressly said. Professor Young, like us, would tie the level of deference to a variety of factors,
although our list of factors is rather different than his. See Young, supra note 4, at 891–92. He
shares with Merrill, however, the view that federal law should cabin agency power to preempt in
a variety of ways we would not. Id.at 896–900.
To be clear, though we describe the deference we advocate as akin to Skidmore, our test
would trigger greater deference based on factors unique to federalism rather than those set out
by Justice Jackson. Moreover, we at times would grant binding or near-binding deference to an
agency’s views when our factors suggest that such deference is appropriate. Thus, we disagree
with Professor Mendelson’s suggestion in her contribution to this symposium, Nina A.
Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision and Agency Interpretation: A
Response to Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE L.J. 2157, 2158–59 (2008), that our bottom line is the
same as hers.
285. Cf. Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference
and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5, 41–42 (2004) (arguing for agency
power to revisit interpretations that have received Skidmore deference). One of us (Professor
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Flexibility is crucial because, as Professor Merrill himself has argued,
much of what goes into a decision about the appropriate national or
state character of a program is highly fact dependent and prone to
286
change over time. To the extent that this flexibility imposes some
planning costs on parties, courts could use other tools to increase the
287
costs or diminish the rewards of change at the agency level.
That wraps up our detour into deference doctrine; we move on
now to the third significant factor at play in the decision to permit
agencies to expand federal power, specifically, the need for more
information. This factor is tied closely to the considerations we have
sketched on agency procedure. If a court needs more information
before it can determine confidently the federalism or other interests
at stake in a given policy, the court may need to allow the policy to go
forward to observe what transpires. If there is flexibility in the
decision to uphold an agency’s action, as we think there must be, the
court (at the invitation of a litigant) can always revisit its earlier
decision should events show that the experiment has harmed either
abstract or economic federalism. Additionally, as we have noted for
factor two, thorough agency proceedings often produce information
that would improve the quality of the court’s decision even before a
288
policy is implemented. For questions that would predictably require
such information, the court would have to provide some incentive to
the agency to develop it. Thus, at least initially, courts would likely
want to offer more deference to enactments whose federalism effects
are uncertain.

Galle) views this as a minor development in administrative law because he believes it is
inevitable that there soon will be a Brand X for the Skidmore doctrine. Given the disadvantages
of complete inflexibility for courts, agencies, and the public, and the sheer doctrinal complexity
of determining which of the courts’ hundreds of pre-Chevron decisions should be subject to
Brand X, the Supreme Court will face enormous pressure to treat both forms of deference
similarly. On the other hand, the other of us (Professor Seidenfeld) thinks that because some of
these disadvantages can be overcome if the agency responds to a Skidmore decision with a
regulation earning it Chevron deference, change is neither inevitable nor necessarily welcome.
But it might be said in turn that the additional effort of promulgating more formal regulations is
precisely what agencies hope to avoid. In any event, we reserve a more extended debate for
another forum.
286. Merrill, supra note 6, at 742–44.
287. See Galle, supra note 252, at 187 (identifying mechanisms, such as expanded availability
of private suits and higher penalties for error, that might enhance private reliance on agency
outcomes); McGarity, supra note 190, at 1387–436 (cataloging judicial review techniques that
tend to slow rate of change of agency rules).
288. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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The last factor that should weigh in favor of agency action is
evidence of congressional authorization. For one thing, congressional
approval would indicate that proponents have paid some of the costs
of overcoming the needed level of constitutional resistance. For
another, to the extent we are mistaken here about the appeal of
agency deliberation relative to that of Congress, deliberation in both
289
branches greatly mitigates our errors. And if both Congress and the
executive are aligned, the political costs to the court of resisting is
higher.
On the other side, there are several factors that would indicate
that a court should be more dubious of agency action. One set of
considerations arises from the arguments we have set out concerning
the need for exclusive judicial control over the Constitution. The case
for a formalist divide between constitutional and statutory
interpretation seems strongest on matters of bedrock importance,
particularly when there are conflicts between bedrock values. The
case is also stronger when there are divisive social conflicts that would
290
benefit from settlement. For example, Rust v. Sullivan for us
represents a classic case in which it made sense for the Court to
reserve meaningful interpretive power to itself; therefore it was a
situation in which it may have been appropriate to prohibit the
291
agency from approaching constitutional boundaries. Whether these
kinds of considerations are ever at play in federalism cases is an open
question. Arguably, though, these arguments may have played some
292
role in decisions such as Gonzales v. Oregon, the physician-assisted
293
suicide case.
A final factor, and another one that might cut against agency
determinations, is the presence of political externalities. That is, when
it appears that an agency is not bearing a significant part of the
political cost of its decisions, a court might suspect that the decision
does not represent good policy. As one of us has detailed elsewhere,

289. Merrill, supra note 6, at 753–57.
290. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
291. Rust dealt with Health and Human Services regulations barring physician recipients of
federal funds from offering abortion counseling services. Id. at 178–81.
292. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
293. Id. at 923 (stating that the Court would yield no deference to agency interpretation that
“displaces the States’ general regulation of medical practice”); see also Gersen, supra note 133,
at 244 (claiming that Oregon involved the application of the clear statement rule to trump
deference to the agency); Metzger, supra note 62, at 2032–36 (explaining that Oregon is difficult
to justify on the ground of administrative law alone).
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this may drive the Supreme Court’s apparent hostility to private
294
rights of action. Congress, or at times agencies, authorizes judicial
resolution of disputes, sometimes with the effect of shifting the
political cost of that resolution to the courts. In resisting private rights
of action, the Court may be demanding that the political branches
accept full responsibility for the rules they make. Similarly, scholars
have read the Court’s anticommandeering and sovereign immunity
jurisprudence as a prohibition on externalities: the federal
government must bear the costs of implementing and enforcing its
295
own laws. We play out some examples of how this might work in
practice in the next Part.
In addition to all of these factors, courts have some other tools
they can use to modulate the appropriate amount of resistance they
offer against federal expansions. For example, the Supreme Court
could change the degree of clarity in the underlying statute that is
296
needed to meet the congressional clear statement requirement. For
maximal resistance, the Court might demand that Congress authorize
any expansion with a tremendous amount of specificity. For instance,
in the § 1983 context, the Supreme Court has taken to claiming that
private litigants must point to statutory language expressly granting
the class to which they belong an entitlement to private relief for the
exact right they seek to enforce before suit can be said to have been
297
“authorized by the . . . laws of the United States.” A lower tier of
resistance might find clear language in a generic provision stating that
an agency is authorized to regulate in an area with the potential for
displacement of state law. Somewhere in the middle would be statutes
permitting the agency to preempt state law when it deems preemption
appropriate.

294. Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 222–27 (2004).
295. E.g., H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 876 (1999); Post & Siegel, supra note 261, at 512; see also D.
Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative to
Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 664 (1985) (arguing that a
requirement that Congress pay for the cost of federal expansions is a significant limit on federal
power).
296. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2122–23 (2002) (explaining that the Court demands several different tiers of
“clarity” to satisfy various presumptions against legislative outcomes).
297. 48 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1458
(2005).
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We do not suggest that integrating all of these considerations
would be uniformly simple or predictable. Again, however, in a
regime in which agencies perceive significant benefits from careful
deliberation and in which courts are willing to grant deference to
create incentives to deliberate, a great number of these kinds of
federalism decisions would be fairly straightforward once or if they
reach the courts.
One final word about state courts: the bulk of the literature to
date has focused on preemption and avoidance decisions in federal
court. As Professor Sharkey has pointed out, though, a significant
number of preemption decisions happen in state court under the
rubric of state court application of federal Supremacy Clause
298
doctrine. She notes that states are more hostile to preemption than
299
their federal counterparts. This perhaps is unsurprising if one
expects state judges to engage in empire building or to prefer to be
able to apply the law that their constituents enacted rather than
300
federal law. Another explanation more generous to state judges
might posit that state courts are, maybe rightfully, suspicious of the
judgments of federal agencies whose behavior they know little about
and have little influence over. Our account here suggests a close
relationship between the ability of a federal court to review and
incentivize agency decisions and that court’s confidence in deferring
to the agency’s outcomes.
Paradoxically, then, it may be that the best way to increase the
influence of federal law in state courts is to give state courts more
control over federal agencies. If our analysis were made a question
not merely of administrative law but also of Supremacy Clause
doctrine, then state courts would be authorized to invoke it when
determining whether state law, such as state tort or contract law, is
preempted by federal regulation. That would give agencies reason to
give heed to the views of state judges. And that, in turn, would give
state judges some reason to give heed to the view of federal agencies.

298. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in
Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1014 (2007).
299. See id. at 1017–18, 1030, 1035–36.
300. See Sharkey, supra note 298, at 1030 (arguing that state judges “as creatures of state
law,” are predisposed toward state law). But see Bradley W. Joondeph, Exploring the “Myth of
Parity” in State Taxation: State Court Decisions Interpreting Public Law 86-272, 13 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 205, 217–18, 225–26 (2003) (summarizing studies finding no support for claim that
state courts favor their own litigants).
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There are downsides to such an arrangement, but we offer it as a
policy possibility that deserves more study.
IV. SOME APPLICATIONS: PREEMPTION AND AVOIDANCE
Our call for a more flexible approach to agency participation in
federalism issues that arise within their regulatory ambit provides a
coherent framework for structuring the resolution of regulatory
federalism issues. In particular, it leads to concrete suggestions about
the role courts should allow agencies to play in two contentious areas
of regulatory federalism: preemption and resolution of federalismrelated constitutional matters.
A. Agency Preemption of State Law
301

Agency preemption of state law raises three related but
nonetheless distinct questions: first, whether Congress should have
authority to delegate preemption of state law to administrative
agencies; second, assuming Congress can delegate such authority to
preempt state law, when should a statute to be read to provide an
agency with that authority; third, assuming that a statute does
authorize the agency to preempt state law, when is an agency justified
in using that authority.
1. Congressional Power to Delegate Authority to Preempt State
Law. Although no commentators have directly proposed that the
Constitution limits Congress’s power to delegate authority to preempt
state regulation, commentators who would require Congress to use
clear language when statutorily preempting state authority to regulate
implicitly suggest such a restriction. Both Professors Young and Hills
propose such a clear statement rule for preemption for the purpose of
improving the legislative process, essentially forcing the legislature to
302
squarely face issues of preemption. One might reasonably infer
301. In this Section, we use the term “preemption” to mean displacement of state authority
to regulate in an area in which it would otherwise be able to do so. Thus, we use the term to
include more than merely requiring state regulations not to conflict with legitimately issued
federal statutes and regulations. For a more detailed discussion, see Mendelson, supra note 4, at
700–01. We think that an agency’s authority to prohibit states from adopting laws inconsistent
with federal regulations follows directly from the Supremacy Clause and recognition that
Congress can give agencies the power to adopt legally binding rules.
302. Hills, supra note 28, at 17, 32–39; Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State
Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 250
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
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from these arguments that Congress should not be able to avoid its
obligation to decide preemption issues by passing the buck to
administrative agencies either.
The arguments of these proponents of clear statement rules,
however, do not convince us that delegating to agencies poses a
significant problem. Professor Hills, for example, premises his
proposal on the reasonable assumption that industry groups influence
Congress to preempt too often because these groups have
organizational advantages over groups that tend to oppose uniform
303
national standards. He recognizes that states are subject to their
own biases in the opposite direction in that they adopt inefficient
304
provincial laws to export regulatory costs. But he argues that the
burden should be on industry to overcome congressional inertia if it
305
desires preemption. Our arguments about the benefits of agency
action, however, suggest that the nation can have its cake and eat it
too by using agencies to determine when federal law should displace
state law.
First, for the reasons we have set out, agencies’ decisions about
306
whether to preempt are likely superior to Congress’s. Moreover, if
the presumption is that agency regulation does not displace state
regulation unless the agency clearly indicates its intent to do so in a
proceeding that is open and invites participation by those affected by
the agency action, then agencies too can motivate diffuse interest
groups to mobilize in opposition to preemption. Our analysis
suggests, in fact, that the costs of meaningfully participating in agency

Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1425 (2001) (viewing clear
statement requirement as “ensur[ing] compliance with federal lawmaking procedures”).
303. Hills, supra note 28, at 17.
304. Id. at 24.
305. Id. at 18–19. Professor Hills argues that allowing states to regulate as the default rule
under legislation that does not clearly preempt regulation is more likely to induce Congress to
act, which in turn will motivate diffuse interest groups to react, propelling the entire system
closer to efficient and politically desired outcomes. Id.; see also Scott Baker & Kimberly D.
Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L REV. 663, 664 (2004) (suggesting an
approach to interpretation in which courts stimulate Congress to fill in statutes with incomplete
terms). But see Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 733–34 (doubting whether Congress would
respond and actually undo the penalizing interpretation).
306. Decisions whether to preempt depend on detailed factual matters and predictions that
agencies are well suited to address. See supra text accompanying notes 171–214; see also William
W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1606–11 (2007) (detailing the richness of the information about regulatory
cost and risks posed by regulated behavior that should factor into the decision whether to
preempt state law).
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proceedings are lower for diffuse interest groups. That fact suggests
that these groups’ influence on the outcomes of agency proceedings
vis-à-vis their industry counterparts is likely greater than their
307
influence would be in the federal legislative process. If our analysis
is correct, so long as courts require agencies clearly and transparently
to state when their regulations displace state law, delegating
responsibility for preemption to agencies reduces the costs of federal
inertia, minimizes inefficient state regulation, and is likely to lead to
outcomes that more optimally balance federalism interests against the
need for efficacious regulatory programs.
2. Agency Authority to Preempt. At first blush, our position
with respect to agency authority to displace state law also seems in
tension with the general clear statement rule requiring Congress to
express itself unmistakably when it wishes to displace state law. If
Congress must act with openness and clarity in preempting, it
arguably also is obliged to speak clearly and openly when it delegates
that authority. But our position is quite consistent with underlying
profederalism rationales for a clear statement rule and follows from
our conclusions about the relative abilities of Congress, courts, and
agencies both to address federalism issues and to force coordinate
institutions of government to address them meaningfully.
Agencies can legitimately make preemption determinations
because agencies are both deliberative and politically accountable.
Our analysis suggests that, in most instances, agencies should be the
institution that in the first instance decides whether to displace state
law because their processes are more deliberative and more
responsive to changes in both political preferences and endogenous
circumstances, such as the state of technology, that influence the
appropriate balance between federalism interests and interests in
efficient regulation. In addition, having agencies make the initial
decision on preemption involves the other branches of government in
the dialogue about federalism values in a fact- and law-specific
context through congressional oversight and judicial review.
Consider a likely scenario in which Congress passes a statute
authorizing agency action that, when passed, does not seem to require
displacement of state law. Hence, the statute is silent about agency

307.

See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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authority to order such displacement. Several years later, as the
agency learns more concretely the issues raised by the regulatory
program, the agency comes to believe that there are net benefits to
displacement. If courts would not allow the agency to preempt
without a clear statement, then the ball is in Congress’s court to
amend the statute. But given the inertia involved in Congress’s law
making process, it is unlikely that Congress will return the volley.
If instead courts allowed agencies to preempt when statutes did
not explicitly deny agencies that authority, the agency would be free
to consider and change the extent of preemption as the regulatory
situation warranted. Congress would remain a player in shaping the
ultimate rule, by monitoring and constraining agencies on issues that
legislators find sufficiently important. Monitoring involves fewer veto
gates, so congressional inertia is less of an impediment to oversight
309
than to statutory enactment. And courts can demand that agencies
take into account the programmatic values of federalism and explain
why uniformity in the particular preemptive context is more
important than the values of experimentation and diversification.
One might object that once an agency decides to preempt, it is
unlikely to reconsider that determination with an open mind if new
circumstances or arguments come to light subsequent to the agency’s
initial decision. In essence, this objection reflects the concern that
even if an agency decision to preempt is warranted at any given time,
the agency has no incentive to revisit the issue later if circumstances
change so as to warrant revising the preemptive effect of federal
310
regulations.
But this objection fails to consider the ways in which preemptive
rules are enforced. Often the issue of enforcement of a preemption
308. Professor Mendelson advocates reading such silence as a failure to authorize an agency
to preempt, because “Congress drafts legislation against the backdrop of the presumption
against preemption, which has been a well-established canon of construction . . . .” Mendelson,
supra note 4, at 709. But existing doctrine is at best ambiguous as to whether agencies can
preempt with a clear statement of their own, regardless of congressional authorization. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text. So there is no clear background rule against which to read
Congress’ intent. And any assumption on this front would not settle the normative debate over
what the best background rule ought to be.
309. Congress can check agency action by oversight hearings and budget cuts, which do not
have to pass through the same veto gates as substantive legislation. See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
310. Cf. Freeman, supra note 282, at 13–14 (arguing that agencies may resist changes to their
institutional purpose); Stern, supra note 98, at 621 (applying cognitive dissonance theory to
explain why agencies might unreasonably resist changing rules even once the rules are simply
proposed).
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provision arises in a proceeding alleging that an entity has violated
some state regulation or transgressed some duty leading to liability
under state law. Such claims, however, are addressed primarily in
311
state court, and state judges seem to apply federal preemption
312
clauses narrowly. Hence it is quite likely that if changes in
circumstances give the states new reasons to regulate, state courts
would credit those reasons and apply the preemption clauses
restrictively. If a state court does so, and the Supreme Court does not
reverse its application of the preemption clause, then effectively the
state court has forced the agency to reconsider its displacement of
313
state law. In this way states are themselves guardians against
administrative inertia. Lastly, if responsiveness to change is an
important concern, then this factor should favor agencies because
314
they are more responsive to change than any of the alternatives. In
short, allowing agencies to address preemption would be more
conducive to an ongoing dialogue about the propriety of any
regulatory preemption that involves all the branches of the federal
government and, most likely, state regulators and courts as well.
3. Particular Agency Decisions to Displace State Law. Our
position regarding how agencies can displace state law reflects our
311. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (noting that federal
preemption is a federal defense and does not provide federal district courts jurisdiction to try
state law claims); see also, e.g., Ramanathan v. Bank of Am., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 471, 472 (Ct. App.
2007) (considering a bank’s defense of federal preemption against a state employment
discrimination suit); City of Chicago v. Comcast Cable Holdings, L.L.C., 872 N.E.2d 368, 380
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that a city’s suit for franchise fees from a cable company was not
preempted by federal communications law).
312. See Sharkey, supra note 298, at 1017 (reporting one study which concluded that
“‘federal courts are considerably more likely to find preemption than are state courts’” (quoting
Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory 20 (Aug. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=422661)).
313. See Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 265, 298 (2007) (“When state courts do go astray and interpret federal law
inappropriately, the ordinary remedy is the same remedy that applies when the lower federal
courts go astray: the Supreme Court can take the case on direct review and correct the error.”).
Thus, an agency cannot limit a state court ruling on the extent of the preemptive force of its
regulations except by making the scope of preemption sufficiently clear and the issue of
preemption sufficiently salient that the Supreme Court might, in a subsequent case, overrule an
inhospitable state court decision.
314. One could respond to this point by advocating resisting all preemptions, including those
by agencies, because any initial preemption decision may be hard to change over time. But that
presumes that the costs of false positives exceed those of false negatives—that it is better to
avoid an incorrect preemption than to permit an incorrect preemption. As we have argued, that
is not necessarily the case. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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determination that agencies can be more transparent, deliberative
and accountable to the polity at any given time than courts and
Congress, but only under certain circumstances. Transparency
depends on the agency allowing the public to know in advance that
the agency is planning to act on an issue with federalism implications.
This suggests that the agency should displace state law only by clearly
stated legislative rules, which by current Executive Order the agency
315
must include in its regulatory plan. Deliberation depends on interest
group access to the agency decisionmaking process, which also
suggests that displacement of state law should occur only by
legislative rule or its equivalent.
Deliberation also requires judicial oversight of the agency
decision to ensure that the agency meaningfully considered the
information provided and position taken by representatives of each
group affected by the decision. This suggests that courts should
review particular decisions displacing state law using hard look
review. Although the benefits of hard look review are debatable, it
can induce agencies to address such crucial issues as the impact of
subjecting regulated entities to fifty different state standards, the
efficacy of the agency’s particular regulatory approach, the
predictability of the continued efficiency of that approach, and the
fluidity of regulatory circumstances and the concomitant need for a
flexible
regulatory
system
that
allows
for
regulatory
316
experimentation. And particular inquiries aside, such review has
seemed to encourage agencies to include in their decisionmaking
processes members of different professions who are likely to
entertain different perspectives about the various regulatory goals
317
that are affected by the agency decision under review. Also, hard
look review, buttressed by political oversight, seems to be well
structured to induce the agency to take greater care in making the
judgments about political preferences that would undergird any
318
analysis of a decision to displace state law.

315. Thus, we would reject Justice Breyer’s suggestion that less formal agency mechanisms
might also have preemptive effect. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
316. Under the hard look test, any factor is potentially relevant; agencies must address those
factors that the reviewing courts consider sufficiently important. Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification, supra note 116, at 496–97.
317. Id. at 510.
318. See Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review, supra note 116, at 562 (suggesting that institutional
checks, including hard look review, “help ensure . . . that agencies . . . implement some
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One possible objection to our optimism that oversight and
procedural structure can adequately constrain agencies from simply
trampling federalism values is the assertion that judicial oversight
requires an enumeration of the relevant factors and how they fit
together to make review a meaningful constraint on agency
preemption. In particular, it may be difficult for courts to police
agency balancing between relatively incommensurable values, such as
319
abstract federalism and more concrete cost savings.
We agree that the trade-offs involving abstract federalism
concerns do raise issues about incommensurable values that might
not be constrained by hard look review. Even if direct review is
difficult, agencies still would be unlikely to make decisions that are
extremely biased by their failure to account for such values. First, the
procedural protections we have suggested would limit agency
discretion to compromise abstract federalism issues. Second, hard
look review at least would force the agency to identify the precise
trade-off it makes between program efficacy and the maintenance of
state sovereign capacity that is implicated by the agency displacement
decision. Although courts could not directly react to a balance by the
agency of these two factors that the court thinks is wrong, the political
process, motivated by the saliency of decisions that are subject to
320
hard look review, could. Hence, once the agency, facing potentially
hard look review, reveals what it has done, political reaction would
constrain the extent to which agencies can downplay abstract
federalism values. In short, so long as agencies ordered displacement
of state law by clear language in legislative rulemaking subject to hard
look review, they would be unlikely to give such short credence to
abstract federalism values as to outweigh the benefits that would
accrue from more accurate and deliberative agency resolution of the
displacement issue.

commonly accepted view of the public good”); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 100, at 491
(noting that hard look review forces an agency to publicly state its reasons for a decision, which
facilitates interest group monitoring and political oversight of such decisions).
319. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 794 (claiming that courts cannot adequately consider
values, like federalism, that are not explicitly connected to the agency decision by statute); see
also McGinnis, supra note 55, at 934 (arguing that hard look doctrine may give courts too much
discretion in their review of agency decisions).
320. By some accounts, judicial review of the National Highway and Transportation Safety
Administration’s automobile safety standards program in the early 1970s motivated the political
reaction to the program that essentially killed it several years year later. See Seidenfeld, supra
note 181 (manuscript at 50).
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Other commentators have asserted that courts cannot easily
321
review agency determinations about federalism values at all. We
think that the objection to hard look review is incorrect in its
apparent assertion that programmatic federalism values are
independent and incommensurate with other regulatory values. Every
regulatory regime necessarily balances achievement of regulatory
322
goals against the costs of achieving them. Hence, whenever an
agency decides on the extent to which it will regulate a matter and the
means that it will choose to do so, it must identify at least implicitly
323
the costs that decision will impose on society. Programmatic
concerns, however, merely lead an agency to use different means to
achieve stated regulatory goals. Uniformity often reduces industry
cost, albeit at the potential expense of statutorily stated regulatory
324
Regulatory experimentation may provide a means of
goals.
reducing long-run costs of regulation, especially if the current
regulatory scheme is both relatively ineffective and the current
325
regulatory environment highly volatile. In short, programmatic
federalism concerns do not pose any different issues for agencies and
reviewing courts than other decisions about regulatory means.
The controversy over the Department of Homeland Security’s
displacement of state law in its regulation of chemical plant security
provides a good example to illustrate how agency preemption might
326
play out under our framework. The department proposed that its

321. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 29, at 794.
322. Decisions regarding trade-offs between devoting resources to one program or another
necessarily involve cost considerations, whether explicitly or not. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental Regulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1237, 1255 (2002).
323. Even under environmental statutes that preclude an agency from factoring regulatory
costs into its decisions, agencies necessarily consider such costs, even if indirectly. Otherwise,
until the nation lowered its pollution to a level that the agency could determine definitively did
not pose any risk to human health, it would have to spend all of society’s resources on cleaning
up pollution. This is not where the EPA draws the regulatory line:
It is hard to imagine any explanation for the EPA’s choice of any particular standard
that can provide a rational basis for choosing one standard over any lower alternative
if the substance at issue is characterized by the absence of a zero-effect threshold and
a linear dose-response curve, and if the EPA is not allowed to consider costs in any
way.
Id. at 1259.
324. See Hills, supra note 28, at 19–20 (discussing the industry’s general preference for
uniform regulation).
325. See Friedman, supra note 222, at 399–400 (describing regulatory experimentation as
more like evolution).
326. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688 (Apr. 9, 2007) (to be
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27). For a description of the controversy, see Buzbee, supra note 306, at
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rules have preemptive effect despite the silence of authorizing
legislation on the preemption question. In its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the agency proposed that its regulations would preempt
327
all conflicting state law, including common law suits. It went on to
note that its regulations reflected a balance between assuring security
and “preserv[ing] chemical facilities’ flexibility to choose security
328
measures to reach the appropriate security outcome.” The NOPR
suggested that state laws requiring greater levels of security, and
perhaps even state health, safety, and environmental regulations that
might affect security, would upset this balance and therefore were
329
The press reported on this proposed rule quite
preempted.
negatively, noting that the proposed rules were weak and would
override state regulations that require greater security measures than
330
those which the department mandated.
In its explanation of the interim final rule it adopted, the
department responded to these press reports and potential
congressional concern about the preemption provisions by conceding
that its language about the need to maintain a balance in its
331
discussion of preemption was too broad. It indicated that its rules
332
would mandate conflict, not field, preemption. It took a broad view
of conflict preemption, however, indicating that its discussion of
preemption “is only meant to indicate that the regulation is not to be
conflicted by, interfered with, hindered by or frustrated by State
333
measures, under long-standing legal principles.” It explicitly stated
that general health and safety regulation by states would not be

1573–75 & n.90; Leticia M. Diaz, Chemical Homeland Security, Fact or Fiction: Is the U.S. Ready
for an Attack on Our Chemical Facilities? An Examination of State and Federal Laws Aimed at
Immediate Remediation, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1171, 1187–89 (2007).
327. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,293 (proposed
Dec. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Editorial, Chemical Insecurity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2007, at A18.
331. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. at 17,727.
332. Id. at 17,726. Under field preemption, states are not allowed to regulate the domain
which federal regulation occupies because federal regulation is meant to be the exclusive
regulation for that domain. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 253–55 (2000). Under conflict
preemption, states may regulate the domain as long as state regulation does not conflict with
federal regulation. Id. at 255.
333. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. at 17,727.
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precluded, but that regulations and laws aimed specifically at the
334
security of chemical facilities were more likely to be preempted.
It warrants noting that the department’s explicit proposal of
preemption in its NOPR generated public awareness and public
335
dialogue on this issue. Thus, the department reacted to this dialogue
by at least purporting to scale back and make less definitive the
336
extent of preemption. Congress then entered the fray by amending
the authority of the department, limiting preemption of state laws to
those that are in “actual conflict” with the department’s chemical
337
plant security regulations.
This demonstrates that agency
preemption in the face of congressional silence is capable of
generating the public dialogue called for by many critics of agency
preemption.
Under the framework we envision, even without congressional
intervention, the department’s explanation of its decision to preempt
would fall far short of what hard look review requires. Again, our test
would proceed in several steps. We would ask, first, whether an
agency has adequately deliberated, in a transparent and relatively
accountable way, the important federalism issues at stake. Although
we urge lowered resistance to agency preemption, we do so only on
the condition that there is exacting deliberation. We then would
examine the extent to which underlying federalism concerns warrant
higher or lower resistance.
The chemical plant regulations would fail at the first step of our
test. In light of the likely severe implications of a terrorist attack on a
chemical facility, the need for minimum security measures is
undeniable. But it is unclear why the balance between security and
flexibility must be fixed once and for all, and for the whole nation, at
this time. Under the hard look doctrine, the department therefore
should have to predict the likely impact of regulations that may be
more strict or inflexible than it considers optimal and to support that
prediction with some credible evidence. In addition, given the thennascent state of understanding about security measures and their
potential effects on plant productivity, as well as the possibility that

334. Id.
335. Id. at 17,717.
336. Id. at 17,727.
337. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 534, 121 Stat. 1844,
2075 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 121 note) (amending Section 550 of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, 6 U.S.C. § 121 note (2006) (Regulations)).
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the industry involves different types of facilities, the department
would have to explain why it would be inappropriate to allow the
states to function as laboratories to test different approaches to
security. To the extent that the designs of facilities change relatively
rapidly, the agency should also have to explain why it is best to
cement the single balance between security and productivity that its
338
rules instate. We do not know whether the agency could meet such
a burden given the nature of the chemical industry, but an inability to
do so would be a strong indication to the public and the courts that
339
the agency’s preemption prescription is not justified.
Assuming that there were more adequate deliberations, the
department regulation would also have posed problems at the latter
steps of our test. First, there was no evident support in the original
340
statute for preemption. Second, it is hard to characterize state
regulation here as an attempt to externalize costs from the state to the
nation as a whole, a characterization that would support preemption.
The benefit of increased security would fall on local communities,
which would be less at risk of the escape of toxic chemicals, whereas
the increased costs would be borne by consumers of the plants’
products. But this characterization is far from convincing given that
the state and local community also bear costs from resulting decreases
in employment and economic activity if the plant moves out of state
or curtails its production, and some forms of terrorist sabotage might
affect consumers.
One point that might have supported preemption is that the
nebulous nature of the regulation’s stated scope would open an
avenue for state court input into a dialogue on whether any particular
341
state regulation or common law duty was displaced. In our
338. See Buzbee, supra note 306, at 1606.
339. Similarly, a court applying our test would refuse to grant preemptive effect to a
regulation where the agency expressly claimed during notice and comment that the regulation
would not preempt state law, as in the Food and Drug Administration example Mendelson
notes. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 704. In that situation, there was no transparent, deliberative
consideration of the preemption question.
340. See 6 U.S.C. § 121 (note).
341. The explanation of the interim final rule rather vaguely preempts state laws that
frustrate or hinder the department’s regulations. Had Congress not precluded regulatory
preemption, it would have fallen on state courts to determine whether any particular state
regulation or tort duty interfered with or hampered the department’s administration of its
regulations. Cf. Merrill, supra note 6, at 743 & n.72. The state court would make its decision in
the fact-specific context of a particular facility. If the department did not like the ultimate
outcome of the state court proceeding, it would retain the option of revising its regulation to
clarify its position using notice-and-comment proceedings. In this way, the determination of
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framework, that might be a reason to think that the underlying
federalism norm was in need of somewhat less protection, as with our
example of State Implementation Plans.
Overall, it is unclear whether a reviewing court should have
deemed department preemption warranted under the latter part of
our test, although most of the signs seem to point against preemption.
We note that the task would be easier if the agency had engaged in a
deliberation about federalism values.
B. Constitutional Avoidance
We next apply our analysis to the debate over constitutional
avoidance. More precisely, we unpack the question whether Congress
should be presumed not to have delegated to agencies the authority
to approach the limits of Congress’s constitutional powers.
Here, again, because our test is sensitive to the precise context in
which federalism questions arise, we cannot say as a general rule that
agencies should always be permitted to tread on policy ground when
Congress’s own step would be dubious. We can say, though, that if
federalism limits are to rest on realist grounds, the reverse is false.
That is, agencies should at least sometimes be permitted to enact
policy that would be constitutionally dubious, even absent clear
342
congressional authorization. The absolute bar adopted by the
Court, we have shown, cannot be defended on the basis of the real343
world characteristics of agencies. To justify this greater license,
however, courts ought to hold agencies to a high standard of
deliberativeness and transparency—one that can likely only be met
through more formal rulemaking.
Before we turn to applying these general rules to a specific
example, though, we should note one additional objection that is
somewhat unique to the avoidance question. In our arguments, we
have focused on identifying the set of doctrines that would best
effectuate the goals of federalism. For the most part these doctrines

whether preemption would have covered the precise state law could have generated a renewed
dialogue that would necessarily reflect the views of the state (at least as reflected in its own
court’s decision) as well as the views of the agency and the affected interest groups, public and
private. In many cases that would be a perfectly valid avenue, in our view, for state
participation. This route is of little avail, however, if most litigation proceeds in federal court.
342. That is, we argue that cases holding that any constitutional doubt invalidates an agency
decision, no matter how clearly enacted by the agency, see supra note 44, are wrong.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 216–62.
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would have to be enacted by judges. What effect, if any, would our
suggestions have on the task of judging?
Even if it is true that rejecting the congressional clear statement
rule is better for federalism, it may not be better for federal judges,
who might prefer to economize on political capital. Conceivably, if
that capital is spread too thinly, the thinning might diminish all kinds
of federal rights, including federalism. The clear statement rule
preserves judicial capital, this argument might go, for the traditional
reasons Professor Bickel offered in favor of avoidance: because it
reduces the occasions on which courts must issue an almost
irreversible constitutional ruling rather than a decision that keeps the
344
political process in play.
But that considers only one side of the scales. The congressional
clear statement rule obliges courts to strike down even those agency
345
decisions that would ultimately survive constitutional scrutiny. By
hypothesis, there are many more of those decisions than there are
clear statements issued by Congress. And, if the resistance norm
functions as it should, on many occasions the rule will never be
reinstated by Congress. As Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed
out, avoidance can thus be equally effective at closing off popular
346
will. Even if the populace is less frustrated by (theoretically)
defeasible quasi-constitutional avoidance decisions than by outright
constitutional holdings, the numbers of avoidance decisions should be
larger.
In addition, some agency decisions that approach the borders of
state autonomy may relieve other, larger political pressures on
347
courts. For instance, agencies may at times themselves promote
state respect for constitutional values, relieving some of the political
“heat” from a court that would otherwise have been left alone to
defend them. To take one example, the Department of Justice has
issued elaborate regulations instructing state and local governments
344. We think this is what Professor Sunstein means to say when he hails the “minimalism”
of the rule against constitutionally dubious agency enactments. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,
supra note 4, at 335.
345. Kelley, supra note 59, at 868.
346. Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74; see also Kelley,
supra note 59, at 834, 847, 852–57 (criticizing the avoidance doctrine as a form of judicial
lawmaking); Manning, supra note 37, at 255 (“[T]he avoidance canon may enshrine a result that
could not have been adopted ex ante.”).
347. See Post & Siegel, supra note 261, at 516–17 (arguing that permitting constitutional
interpretation outside the courts allows courts to share the burdens of defending and defining
rights).
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how best to accommodate the particular needs of individuals with
disabilities, which greatly reduces the pressure on the Supreme Court
348
to recognize a strong Fourteenth Amendment right to the same.
Thus, it is theoretically indeterminate whether avoidance on net
economizes on political frustration with the judicial branch. We
welcome suggestions as to how Professor Bickel’s theory could ever
be subjected to empirical test. In the meanwhile, although we view
this objection as a serious one, we largely set it aside in our analysis.
Turning, then, to some specifics, under our analysis the federal
agency would have won in SWANCC and similar cases. Recall that
the SWANCC Court invalidated an Army Corps of Engineers
regulation implementing the Clean Water Act, on the ground that the
regulation’s effort to govern waters only “hydrologically” connected
to the navigable waters of the United States raised a serious
349
constitutional question. The mere fact that the regulation was
constitutionally questionable ended the case; the Court presumed
that Congress would not have delegated to the Army Corps of
Engineers any authority to reach a constitutionally dubious
350
outcome.
Our approach would reject that presumption and move on
instead to ask whether there were any particular features of the
regulation that would make it particularly deserving of resistance. We
see no danger of political externalities. The issue of federal authority
to regulate waters hydrologically connected to navigable waters is
extremely unlikely to involve a general question of federal power
under the Commerce Clause that might affect any agency other than
the Army Corps of Engineers. Nor do we perceive any conflict
between federalism and other core rights that might best be reserved
to judicial control. In addition, Congress defined navigable waters in
the Clean Water Act to include all navigable waters within the nation
351
as that term is constitutionally construed. By writing the statute with
this language, it appears that Congress fully expected the Army Corps
of Engineers to regulate up to the limitation on navigable waters that
the Supreme Court would ultimately adopt, and therefore that

348. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101–.608 (2007).
349. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
350. Id.
351. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (citing S.
REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)).
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Congress intended to authorize the Army Corps of Engineers to raise
this constitutional question. Moreover, given Congress’s apparent
determination to test constitutional limits, the Court is likely well
served by the opportunity to benefit from the agency’s ongoing
deliberation over and experience with expansive federal Clean Water
352
Act authority.
The result of this analysis is that the Court would then have been
obliged to confront the constitutional question. If its conclusion at
that stage was that the regulation was invalid, it would not have much
opportunity to observe further agency deliberations, depending on
353
prevailing ripeness doctrines. But the point is that, in the absence of
our approach, the Court usually is obliged to approach the
constitutional question without the benefit of any agency efforts at
all.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that the realist view of federalism recognizes
that the principle of limited federal power is an instrumental one.
Courts should choose the set of rules, including rules of
administrative law, that best achieve the ends sought by federalism.
On this view, it appears that prevailing doctrine and defenders of it
somewhat overstate the degree to which federalism norms need
judicial protection against the conduct of federal agencies. On most
measures, agencies are usually a better forum for resolving questions
of the state-federal balance than Congress. Given the right
combination of judicial rules, the quality of agency deliberation is
superior, and more transparent and accountable to interested parties.

352. We note some kinship between our method here and the approach that appears to have
implicitly been adopted by the Second Circuit in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d
444 (2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008), the “fleeting expletives” case.
The court claimed that it applied ordinary administrative law principles to its review of the
FCC’s decision to change its policy on isolated swear words on broadcast television. See id. at
454–67. But it seems that the degree and kind of explanation the court expected was ratcheted
up by the possibility that the FCC’s ruling might exceed federal authority—might violate the
First Amendment. See id.
353. That is, ripeness doctrine determines when an agency determination can be subjected
to judicial review. If the law of ripeness is open to court challenges very early in the
administrative process, courts have relatively little opportunity to observe the agency’s views.
Similarly, if ripeness caselaw permits preenforcement challenges, then the court does not have
the chance to see the real-world effects of the agency’s decision before it must evaluate it.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
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Although the ease of enacting agency rules in theory threatens to
make federal expansion too easy, in many cases it would be easy to
balance this danger against the need for federal intervention.
Thus, we disagree with those who have urged that agency
authority either to preempt state law or to enact regulations at the
edges of federal authority should be limited to instances in which
there is a clear statutory mandate. We acknowledge that there are
instances in which agency action needs close supervision, direct
authorization, or both. But there also are a wide variety of agency
decisions in which such tight reins cannot be justified on realist
grounds. That leaves, at most, some form of formalist explanation for
prevailing doctrinal limits on agency action—an explanation we have
seen floated but never defended thoroughly in the existing literature.
Although we have focused here on preemption and avoidance,
the question of institutional competence is pervasive throughout
nearly all important federalism controversies. Thus, as we suggested
at the outset, our analysis could also be applied to the interpretation
both of federal private rights of action and conditions on federal
grants. In both instances, Supreme Court doctrine seems to demand a
clear statement from Congress before imposing obligations against
states, while leaving it highly doubtful whether agencies can be the
354
source of that clear statement. Our theory suggests that, to the
extent that the preference for Congress is grounded in realist terms,
agencies should often be a perfectly acceptable source of clear
355
authorization.
Ranging farther afield, our work here also could have
implications for areas of federalism doctrine that do not presently
touch on agencies at all. For example, a central conundrum of the
Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence has been its struggle
to decide whether it can reach defensible answers on the balance
between federal interests and state autonomy, or whether instead it
356
ought to force Congress to act in its place. If we are right that
agencies are often the best positioned of the three branches to make
354. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
355. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 2, at 249–50 (suggesting that an analysis of preemption and
private right of action questions should produce results more similar than those provided by
existing doctrine).
356. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Redish & Nugent, supra note 250, at 591–95, 617; Edward A. Zelinsky,
Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce
Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 29–32, 84–87 (2002).
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these kinds of decisions, then the critical—and so far neglected—
question the Court ought to face is how it can best promote some
kind of executive role in reviewing state burdens on national and
international trade.
Relatedly, scholars have begun to consider whether Congress
ought to have unlimited power to authorize state discrimination
357
against interstate commerce or migration. We humbly suggest that
our analysis here implies that Congress should be encouraged to
share its deliberations with the executive. Just as agencies are
sometimes granted greater license when authorized by Congress, so
too Congress might be granted greater freedom to reach federalismimplicating outcomes when those outcomes are triggered by the sort
of transparent, deliberative agency decision we describe here.

357. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1468, 1470–78 (2007); Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 155–59 (2005).

